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Abstract 
We use administrative longitudinal data on earnings, impairment, and mortality to replicate 
and extend Bound’s seminal study of rejected applicants to federal Disability Insurance (DI). We 
confirm Bound’s main result that rejected older male applicants do not exhibit substantial labor 
force participation. We show this result is stable over time, robust to more narrow control groups, 
and similar within gender, impairment, industry, and earnings groups. However, we also find that 
younger rejected applicants have substantial employment after application. To what extent this 
translates into potential employment for new beneficiaries depends on which group among them is 
considered “on the margin” of receiving DI. If we use initially rejected applicants – a large and 
growing fraction of new beneficiaries – the resulting counterfactual employment rate for younger 
applicants is low, too. We also find that rejected applicants bear signs of economically induced 
applicants. DI appears to induce a growing number of less successful workers to apply, an important 
fraction of which ends up without benefits and non-employed. 
                                                 
1 This research was supported by the U.S. Social Security Administration through grant #10-P-98363-1-05 to the 
National Bureau of Economic Research as part of the SSA Retirement Research Consortium. The findings and 
conclusions expressed are solely those of the authors and do not represent the views of SSA, any agency of the Federal 
Government, or the NBER.  
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1.  Introduction 
 There have been large and continuing increases in the number of individuals receiving 
federal Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) since the system was conceived in its current form 
in the 1950s and 1960s. During the same period, labor force participation of older and lower-skilled 
men has fallen steadily, with a slow-down only in the 1990s. These parallel developments have led to 
the recurring questions of whether the generosity of DI induces low-income workers to apply for 
and sometimes receive benefits, and whether these individuals would work in the absence of DI.1 To 
obtain an estimate of the potential labor force attachment of new DI beneficiaries in the absence of 
DI, Bound (1989) suggested using employment of rejected DI applicants as a counterfactual. 
Bound’s argument was that rejected applicants are more similar to new beneficiaries than the typical 
worker, but are also likely to be in better health; thus, their labor force attachment constitutes an 
upper bound for employment behavior of new beneficiaries. Using data covering the mid to late 
1970s, Bound (1989) found that the employment rate of older male rejected DI applicants was quite 
low.2 This suggests few new beneficiaries would be expected to work in the absence of DI. 
 Since Bound’s seminal analysis, the federal DI system has undergone significant changes. 
Reforms of the process of determination of eligibility starting with the 1984 Amendments have 
made the screening process more favorable to applicants and made the system more accessible for 
individuals suffering mental health conditions. During the same period, the labor market prospects 
of low-skilled workers have declined. Partly as a result of these changes, the number of new 
beneficiaries has increased rapidly during the 1980s and 1990s; applicants and new beneficiaries have 
become younger, healthier, and more likely to suffer from back pain and mental health problems 
(e.g., Duggan and Imberman 2006). Similarly, we show that average earnings of applicants have 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Bound and Burkhauser (1999) for a description of the trends in disability, DI receipt, and labor force 
participation, as well as a summary of the main recurring themes of the literature. 
2 Bound (1989) focuses on male applicants age 45-64 since this constituted the majority of applicants in the 1970s.  
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fallen, especially during the mid-1980s. The question as to whether workers are induced to apply to 
DI because of economic conditions and perhaps leave the labor force as a result is thus more 
pressing than ever (e.g., Autor and Duggan 2006). However, the increasing heterogeneity within the 
group of applicants makes it more difficult to find an appropriate counterfactual for potential 
employment behavior of new beneficiaries. Similarly, the changing composition of applicants and 
the shifts in the DI system imply the original analysis by Bound (1989) needs to be updated. 
 In this paper, we replicate Bound’s analysis for older male DI applicants for the 1980s and 
1990s and extend it to encompass younger workers and women. We merge several administrative 
data sources providing us with detailed longitudinal information on earnings, impairments, and 
mortality of new DI beneficiaries, rejected DI applicants, and non-applicants covering the period 
from 1978 to 2004. The data allow us to deepen Bound’s original analysis in several ways; we can 
assess whether our main comparison is robust to using workers with very similar characteristics to 
generate counterfactuals; we can study differences by key groups (e.g., impairment groups); and we 
can analyze earnings and employment dynamics before and after application. Access to 
administrative data also leads us to exploit institutional features of the application process to provide 
a tighter bound on labor force participation in the spirit of Bound (1989). 
 Our results confirm Bound’s (1989) finding that rejected male applicants age 45-64 have 
weak labor force attachment; in fact, despite differences in the nature of the data, for the early 1980s 
our numbers are very similar to his. This finding is very stable over time despite large changes in the 
DI system. It also holds for female applicants and within impairment, industry, or earnings groups. 
Similarly, it is not altered when we control for the systematic ex-ante differences between new 
beneficiaries and rejected applicants that we find. If we were to use employment of rejected 
applicants as an upper bound, we would predict little labor force attachment in the absence of DI 
for the traditionally largest group of beneficiaries. 
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We also find that younger rejected applicants, whether male or female, continue to have 
reduced but substantial labor force attachment after application to DI. Again, this result is stable 
over time and very robust across sub-groups. Since the average age of applicants and new 
beneficiaries has been declining over time, this finding has potentially important implications. To 
assess how high implied potential employment rates for younger new beneficiaries are, we can use 
our data to isolate the fraction of new beneficiaries whose application was initially rejected and use it 
as estimate of beneficiaries who were “on the margin” between receiving and not receiving DI.  
A large and increasing fraction of applicants who are initially rejected in the administrative 
adjudication of their claim is later awarded benefits through judicial review. The loss in earnings 
potential and health condition of these applicants is not deemed to be sufficiently strong during the 
initial screening of their case. We show that the mortality rate of these new beneficiaries is very 
similar to that of finally rejected applicants and much lower than immediately accepted new 
beneficiaries. We argue it is this group to which the counterfactual employment behavior of rejected 
applicants is most likely to apply. If we apply Bound’s counterfactual to the fraction of those new 
beneficiaries who were initially rejected, the potential employment rate of new beneficiaries is on the 
lower side for younger individuals as well. 
Last, we find that the rejected applicants and to some extent initially rejected new 
beneficiaries bear some signs of workers who have been induced to apply to DI because of 
worsening economic conditions. The average earnings prior to application of both of these groups 
has been declining, especially in the early to mid 1980s; we also find average pre-application earnings 
and employment of rejected applicants is considerably lower than that of new beneficiaries; this gap 
widens significantly in the years just prior to application, especially for older applicants.  
These findings contribute to two questions that have motivated an important and growing 
literature. First, our results speak to the question of whether a substantial fraction of new 
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beneficiaries would be in the labor force in the absence of DI. We significantly extend Bound’s 
original analysis to show that his results for older male applicants are stable over time, robust to the 
use of much more detailed control groups, and similar between impairment groups. However, we 
also show that the changing decomposition of DI applicants is likely to change Bound’s original 
conclusion that DI is unlikely to reduce labor force participation. This answer will depend on 
potential employment behavior of younger new beneficiaries, and which among these are deemed 
more likely to be “on the margin” of working. 
Second, our findings confirm that DI appears to induce some workers to apply because of 
adverse economic conditions (e.g., Stapleton and Rupp 1995, Autor and Duggan 2003). We are the 
first to study pre-application employment and earnings dynamics to show that rejected applicants 
bear characteristics of workers with difficult labor market status. Our results suggest for male 
applicants of all ages this pattern became stronger in the mid 1980s. Among new beneficiaries, 
especially those initially rejected but later allowed appear to be increasingly less economically 
successful and healthier. To better understand the labor market effects of federal DI, further 
examination of these groups is likely to yield important insights. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we analyze employment and 
earnings of rejected older male DI applicants and contrast it to that of non-applicants; we first 
compare our results to that of Bound (1989), and then study the evolution of employment before 
and after application and over time; we also compare workers with very similar prior employment 
histories to assess the robustness of the results to pre-application differences in employment and 
earnings. In the third section, we replicate these results for younger workers and for women. In the 
fourth section, we study different earnings, industry, and impairment groups, while in the fifth we 
present regression results that control for prior earnings, age, and year effects. In the sixth section, 
we analyze characteristics of initially rejected new beneficiaries. We then use these workers to 
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present alternative counterfactual employment rates. In section seven, we summarize the role of 
changes in the age-decomposition of new beneficiaries on the potential employment of DI 
recipients implied by Bound’s counterfactual exercise. The last section concludes.  
2.  Employment and Earnings of DI Applicants from 1978 to 2004 – Older Men 
To study the economic outcomes of applicants to DI, we merged several administrative data 
sources. The first is a 1% sample of all initial applications to DI from 1978 onwards. This file 
contains information on the application (such as age, gender, education and impairment of the 
applicant) as well as information on the decision up to the reconsideration phase.3 Since many 
applications are decided in later stages of the decision process, to obtain information on whether 
applicants actually received DI, we merged on final benefit receipt from SSA’s Master Beneficiary 
Record (MBR).4 This allows us to identify applicants who were awarded benefits immediately, those 
whose claims were finally rejected, and those who were initially rejected but eventually received 
benefits. Since the application status of the first two applicant groups is relatively unambiguous, we 
will limit our main analysis to initialyl allowed (termed “new beneficiaries”) and finally rejected 
applicants.5 We will return to the intermediate group below.6 
                                                 
3 The 831 File only contains information on all new applications to DI; there is no information on repeated 
applications or applications decided in the judicial part of the review process. 
4 The so-called 831 File was merged to the MBR, the MEF, and the Numident at the Social Security Administration 
using Social Security Numbers, gender, and age. For a more detailed description of these data sources and the merge 
see our longer predecessor paper Von Wachter, Song, and Manchester (2007a).  
5 This classification of rejected applicants comes close to that used by Bound (1989); he classifies as new 
beneficiaries individuals that are receiving DI benefits, and as rejected applicants those reporting to have at some 
point applied and that are currently not receiving benefits (see his footnote 12). Since on average workers in his data 
have applied to DI four years prior to the survey, the majority of rejected applicants are likely to be final rejections. 
6 Unfortunately, we do not know at which stage beyond the administrative reconsideration stage an initially rejected 
applicant eventually got awarded benefits; similarly, we do not know at which stage a denied applicant accepted the 
rejection. We define an application to be “rejected” if a worker does not receive benefits within ten years of his first 
application. For those rejected initially, we do not know whether they appealed their decision in the judicial phase of 
the reconsideration or whether they reapplied. Some of initially rejected applicants may thus return to work prior to 
reapplication. 
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 The information on employment and earnings we use is derived from uncapped annual 
salaries recorded on workers’ W-2s and contained in SSA’s Master Earnings File (MEF). A worker is 
called employed if he or she has any positive earnings in a given calendar year. This is likely to 
understate employment, since we miss non-W-2 sources of labor income, chiefly self-employment 
income.7 In Table 1, we use the merge between different administrative data sets to replicate as 
closely as possible the main table of Bound’s (1989) seminal analysis (his Table 2). The first columns 
of Table 1 show our employment measure for workers applying to DI in 1982. To be comparable 
with Bound, we limit ourselves to male applicants age 45 to 64 in 1982. The table also shows our 
measure of employment for a 0.2% random sample of male workers in the same age range drawn 
from the MEF.8 Two years after application, only 40.4% of rejected applicants have any positive 
earnings. Since we do not have information on hours worked, we also show the fraction of workers 
with earnings above a minimal threshold (defined as one quarter’s worth of full-time earnings at the 
2000 minimum wage). Only 31.6% of rejected applicants have earnings beyond the minimal 
threshold, compared to 70.2% of non-applicants.9 These numbers are of similar magnitude as the 
fraction of rejected applicants that were found working in Bound’s study.10  
                                                 
7 For a detailed discussion of earnings information from the Master Earnings File see Kopzcuk, Saez, and Song 
(2007). 
8 We restricted applicants and non-applicants to be insured by DI. In addition, to ensure a minimal attachment to the 
labor force (chiefly for the non-applicants), we required all workers to have any amount positive earnings at least 
once in 1978 to 1981. This restriction has no bearing on our results, and mainly affects the employment level of non-
applicants. The year 1982 was chosen to have a minimal amount of information on earnings prior to application. 
This also avoids using the MEF years 1978-1980 too heavily in our analysis, which have a high fraction of imputed 
values (see Kopzcuk, Saez, and Song 2007). 
9 In results not shown, we found that these patterns in Table 1 and Figure 3 hold if we exclude workers above age 54 
and are thus not simply driven by retirement. 
10 An exact comparison is made difficult by the different nature of the data. In Bound’s 1978 Survey of Disability 
and Work, 69.3% of the population reported being employed at the survey date, whereas 86.7% reported having 
worked at some point in 1977; among rejected applicants, 28.7% reported being employed at the survey date, and 
40.4% report having worked at some point in 1977. Since labor force participation rates for older men were falling 
during the period, the fraction with positive earnings in 1984 is expected to be lower than 86.7%, but perhaps not as 
low as 73.3% (given the small fraction of applicants, the fact that we use non-applicants instead of an estimate of the 
population has little bearing on the comparison). The understatement is likely due to the absence of self-employment 
earnings in our data. This may also lead us to understate somewhat employment of rejected applicants, but this is 
unlikely to affect our overall conclusions. 
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 In addition to employment, Table 1 also shows average annual earnings and median positive 
earnings for rejected applicants. Median earnings of rejected applicants are an order of magnitude 
lower than that of non-applicants. As we will see below, this is in part due to significant earnings 
differences existing prior to application. However, the earnings loss for rejected applicants during 
application is still very high. Two years before to two years after application, the difference in 
average earnings is between 40% and 50% (not taking into account earnings trends for non-
applicants).11 The low earnings and large earnings losses confirm the results in Bound (1989) that 
rejected older male DI applicants have a low degree of labor force attachment, especially relative to 
non-applicants. The non-trivial amount of employment among initially rejected new beneficiaries 
fades and is likely to be due to our way of dating DI receipt (see the last section and Appendix figure 
6).  
 In keeping with Bound (1989)’s main table, Table 1 also reports limited information on 
demographics available from the administrative data. Median age of rejected applicants is 55 years, 
slightly younger than new beneficiaries and older than non-applicants. Rejected applicants are more 
likely to be non-white, and less educated (available only starting in 1987).12 As discussed at the 
outset, glancing across columns, the table confirms that from 1982 to 1992 applicants have become 
younger and are increasingly more likely to be non-white. This holds for all applicants, but also 
within the group of older men. 
 The administrative data do not contain information on the health status of applicants. 
However, we were able to merge individuals’ date of death from the Numident file maintained by 
                                                 
11 See Figure 3 for average earnings including zeros, and Appendix figure 4 for the median of positive earnings. 
Note that in 2000 dollars, median 1977 earnings for the population in Bound’s Table 2 would be $39,000 (using CPI 
inflation published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics), similar to what we find for non-applicants. The same figure is 
$14,840 for rejected applicants, which is higher than what we find. These differences could well be part of a secular 
decline in average (pre and post application) earnings we find for rejected applicants, and may arise from changes in 
the DI system during that period (see von Wachter, Song, and Manchester (2007a). The difference does not affect 
the overall similarity of our findings for older men with the results in Bound. The low incidence and amount of 
positive earnings we find for new beneficiaries is also close to that reported in Bound. 
12 Information on education is available only for DI applicants from the 831 file. 
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the Social Security Administration.13 The evidence from death rates confirms Bound’s conclusion 
that rejected applicants are less healthy than the overall population; their death rate two years after 
initial application to DI is a little less than double the rate for non-applicants. The lower health 
status is not surprising since they are more likely to be drawn from a population with low earnings, 
low education, and less likely to be white. However, as in Bound, the table also shows that they are 
in much better health than new beneficiaries, among whom a large fraction dies within four years of 
application. The annual mortality rate of rejected applicants increases smoothly with age.14 Glancing 
across columns, the table confirms evidence that mortality rates of applicants have been falling over 
time, especially in the 1990s. 
 The difference in mortality between allowed and rejected applicants can be attributed in part 
to differences in the distribution of impairments recorded on the DI application. In Table 1, we 
grouped and listed information on the primary impairment code – available on a consistent basis 
starting in the mid-1980s – to be as comparable as possible to the self-reported health conditions 
reported in Bound.15 The majority of applicants apply for DI due to health conditions in the 
musculoskeletal system (e.g., back problems), circulatory system (e.g., cardiovascular diseases), 
mental disorders, and neoplasms (e.g., cancer). Rejected applicants are much less likely to have 
                                                 
13 This file contains information on date of death for individuals with a valid Social Security number. Its coverage is 
considered reliable starting from the late 1970s and is better for men and older individuals (see Hill and Rosenwaike 
2002). 
14 The difference in annual mortality rates between new beneficiaries and rejected applicants is high in the first five 
to six years after application and then fades (see Figure 6). As a benchmark, the annual mortality rates for male 
workers in Pennsylvania age 55 born around 1930 with stable attachment to the labor force from 1974 to 1979 is 
about 1% (von Wachter and Sullivan 2007). Over three years (from 1982 to 1984) this leads to a cumulated death 
rate of 3%. This is a bit lower than what we see in the first column of Table 1 for non-applicants with much weaker 
labor force attachment (whose average age is 54.6), but within the same ballpark. 
15 In contrast to Bound who allows multiple impairments per person, we only record the main impairment on the DI 
application (i.e., we do not use information from the secondary impairment code available in the administrative 
data). The advantage of the administrative data is that the impairment is presumably documented by medical 
examination and thus on more solid grounds. On the other hand, in response to administrative requirements it may 
not fully correspond to the actual health status of an individual. Comparing our impairment distribution to Bound’s, 
the relative ranking is similar with the exception of conditions relating to the respiratory and digestive system; this 
may be due to the different time period (1986 vs. 1977) and because some of these conditions may be less frequent 
as primary impairment classes. 
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cancer or circulatory problems, two impairments with high mortality rates. As further discussed 
below, beneficiaries who initially rejected are much more likely to have musculoskeletal conditions 
than applicants awarded benefits immediately, leading them to have much lower mortality rates as 
well. 
 Overall, a highly similar picture emerges for older men applying to DI in 1982 as found in 
Bound (1989) for the late 1970s. Rejected applicants have limited attachment to the labor force and 
low earnings. They are more likely to be nonwhite, are younger, and are less skilled than new 
beneficiaries. They are also healthier than the majority of new beneficiaries, but less healthy than the 
overall population. Thus, were employment and earnings of rejected applicants to be taken as an 
upper bound for the potential behavior of new beneficiaries in the absence of DI, their predicted 
labor force attachment would be at best weak. 
 However, as discussed at the outset, since the late 1970s there have been strong changes in 
the administration and rules governing federal DI; during the same time, the number of older men 
applying to DI has increased (Figure 1, Panel A), and they have become younger and healthier.16 
Using the longitudinal nature of our data we can also show that they have become poorer over time. 
Figure 2 (Panel A) displays average annual earnings in the five years before application for all 
applicants, all new beneficiaries, and finally rejected applicants. With the exception of a rebound 
during the DI retrenchment in the early 1980s, average earnings of DI applicants and in particular of 
rejected applicants has declined in the early to mid-1980s. It is natural to ask whether these changes 
in characteristics have had an impact on the employment behavior of rejected DI applicants.  
                                                 
16 Figure 1 displays the number of applicants, all new beneficiaries, and finally rejected applicants in our sample for 
men by age-group; the corresponding numbers for women are shown in Appendix Figure 3. Note that Figure 1 and 2 
display age up until 54 for the older age-groups instead of age 64; the pattern are very similar once the older age-
group is included (the figures were being generated when the working paper went into press for the RRC 
conference). 
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Table 1 shows our measures of employment and earnings after application for male 
applicants age 45-64 in 1987 and in 1992. The table suggests at best minor changes in the fraction of 
rejected applicants with any or minimal annual earnings that may be well be attributable to 
fluctuations in single calendar years. Median earnings of rejected applicants have declined from 1982 
to 1987, and have since then remained essentially unchanged. The change is likely to correspond to 
the general trend in average pre-application earnings of rejected applicants noted in Figure 2, rather 
than reflecting a significant change in post-application labor force attachment. The change in 
employment and earnings at application has remained stable over time. 
 To abstract from fluctuations in single years and to show the entire dynamic pattern of 
employment and earnings before and after application, Figure 3 displays the evolution of average 
labor force attachment for workers applying in 1982-1987, 1987-1992, and 1992-1997, respectively.17 
Panels A and B focus on older men and contain several important results. First, averaging over 
multiple application cohorts confirms a low degree of employment and earnings for rejected 
applicants; at best, it appears evidence from single years in Table 1 tends to overstate participation. 
Second, employment and earnings after rejection are surprisingly stable over time. The most 
apparent change is the reduction in pre-application earnings of rejected DI applicants we already 
noted in Figure 2.18 With this exception, employment and earnings of new beneficiaries and rejected 
applicants have remained virtually unchanged, at least since the early 1980s. The evidence in Bound 
suggests the pattern was similar in the late 1970s as well. 
                                                 
17 Again, we focus only on applicants that were either awarded benefits immediately or finally rejected, postponing 
the discussion of the more ambiguous initially rejected beneficiaries. The age restriction in the figures still refers to 
the baseline year (e.g., 1982, 1987, and 1992 for the three groups of application years, respectively). We maintain 
this restriction to be able to impose similar criteria for non-applicants in a regression analysis (preliminary results 
are discussed in von Wachter, Song, and Manchester 2007a). This implies the actual age at application lies above the 
stated age-ranges. Replicating the figures with age at application gives very similar results.  
18 More variability in earnings 8 to 5 years prior to application is to be expected, since for these years we have fewer 
observations. 
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 Another important result of Figure 3 is the dynamic pattern before and after application. 
Employment and earnings of rejected applicants are lower than that of new beneficiaries prior to 
application; these workers seem to be less successful in the labor market to begin with. This 
impression is strengthened when we consider the evolution of earnings and employment before 
application. Rejected applicants experience particular declines in earnings and employment around 
the year of application. However, the gap between new beneficiaries and rejected applicants begins 
to widen three to four years prior to application in what appears to be a significant pre-application 
dip in labor market success. Almost two thirds of the decline in earnings appears to be completed 
prior to application. Employment and earnings for new beneficiaries falls very steeply around 
application (though some early trend in earnings is apparent for new beneficiaries as well).19 
 The differences in pre-application employment and earnings observed in Figures 1 and 3 
raise the question of whether we are comparing apples and oranges. Rejected applicants may face 
very different labor market prospects than new beneficiaries prior to application; in this case, their 
employment experience after application may be less relevant as a counterfactual for potential 
employment patterns of new beneficiaries. One way to address the question to what extent the 
patterns in Table 1 and Figure 3 are driven by pre-application differences is to compare rejected 
applicants and new beneficiaries with similar employment histories. Within a more narrow group, 
rejected applicants are more likely to yield a relevant counterfactual or upper bound for the behavior 
of new beneficiaries. 
 Figure 4 shows the evolution of employment and earnings for allowed and rejected DI 
applicants who were employed at the same employer in the four years prior to the respective base 
                                                 
19 A small part of the pattern in Figure 3 can be attributable to aging and an overall economic trend. We will control 
for age and year effects in revision of this paper (for preliminary results see von Wachter, Song, and Manchester 
2007a). There, we also discuss statistical significance of the displayed dynamic pattern. 
 13 
period (e.g., for 1982, we required stable employment from 1978 to 1981, etc.).20 For these workers, 
initial employment rates are close to 100% by construction. Yet, even among this stable group of 
workers, rejected applicants experience a stronger dip in employment prior to application than new 
beneficiaries (Panel A). Similarly, employment rates post-application are again quite low. Annual 
earnings prior to application are now similar (Panel B). Both groups experience a small pre-
application decline in earnings; however, post-application earnings of rejected applicants are as low 
as for the full sample (Figure 3). As a result, rejected applicants with stable prior employment 
experience much larger losses in earnings; we will return to this point when we analyze high-wage or 
manufacturing workers in Section 4. 
 Overall, we believe it is fair to summarize our results for older male applicants to DI as 
follows: 
(1) rejected applicants do work, but little and at low earnings; 
(2) these patterns have been stable for applicants in years 1982 to 1997; 
(3) there is a pre-application dip in employment for rejected applicants, and a smaller pre-
application decline for earnings; 
(4) the patterns we find do not appear to be driven by heterogeneity among allowed and 
rejected applicants, but hold within more narrow groups of workers. 
The evidence presented here is supportive of Bound’s (1989) original assessment of the 
work behavior of rejected DI applicants. If we follow Bound’s claim that employment of rejected 
applicants represents an upper bound for that of new beneficiaries, it appears unlikely that a majority 
                                                 
20 The MEF contains the Employer Identification Number (EIN) for each earnings amount recorded on the workers’ 
W-2. We chose the EIN from which a worker had the most earnings in any given year as the main EIN, and 
classified workers as ‘stable’ if this EIN did not change in the four years prior to the relevant base period. Some 
slippage arises for workers temporarily switching employers or for multiple job holders, but correcting for such 
patterns affects job mobility rates only marginally (Von Wachter, Song, and Manchester 2007b). Appendix Figure 2 
shows the fraction of so-defined ‘stable’ workers among all denied and allowed DI applicants over time for our three 
baseline periods. As expected, new beneficiaries are more likely to have been employed at the same firm prior to the 
base period. There is no strong time trend apparent from the figure, though a slight age-gradient is apparent. 
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of older male beneficiaries – the traditional target group for DI –would work in the absence of DI. 
However, our results also suggest that rejected applicants are worse off economically to begin with, 
and particularly so in the period immediately prior to application. With respect to our initial 
questions, it appears that a) it is unlikely that DI strongly reduces labor force participation among 
older men; and b), it is likely that DI attracts applications from workers in difficult economic times, 
thereby distorting incentives. The evidence presented here suggests that a substantial fraction may 
be screened out at application.  
However, any assessment of DI based on older men must remain partial because of an 
increasing fraction of younger and female applicants. Even within the group of older workers, we 
are comparing individuals with very different impairments and labor force histories, raising the 
question of whether a statement based on the average rejected applicant is meaningful. We turn to 
these questions in Sections 3 and 4. 
3.  The Employment Behavior of Rejected Younger and Female DI Applicants 
 Applicants and beneficiaries have become progressively younger over time; from Table 1, 
the share of men ages 30-44 among men above 30 doubled from 1982 to 1992, and has increased 
further since then (Appendix Figure 2). Particularly relevant for our purposes, a non-negligible and 
increasing share of rejected applicants tends to be younger – whereas men ages 30-44 constituted 
about 45% of rejected applicants in 1982, they were about 55% in 1992. Thus, especially when 
studying employment of rejected applicants, one has to include younger workers. 
 Table 2 replicates Table 1 for men age 30-44; the lower panels of Figure 3 show the dynamic 
pattern of employment and earnings.21 The numbers in the table and figure imply the following 
findings; (1) the employment rate of rejected applicants after application is 50-60%, down from 70-
                                                 
21 The choice of age 30 as a cut-off was mainly to ensure that we have a significant number of pre-application years 
to measure employment and to ensure that the majority of workers is covered by DI. 
 15 
80% prior to application; (2) pre-application earnings of rejected applicants are lower than that of 
new beneficiaries, especially since the mid-1980s; (3) compared to pre-application earnings, average 
earnings after application and rejection decline; however, they remain considerably higher than that 
of older rejected applicants; (4) there is a clear widening of the gap between allowed and rejected 
applicants in pre-application employment (and somewhat for earnings); (5) these patterns are very 
stable over time, again with the exception of a drop in average earnings of rejected applicants in the 
mid-1980s (see also Figure 2, Panel B). 
Since the comparison among all younger allowed and rejected applicants to DI may be 
difficult due to differential pre-earnings trends, we again replicated the pattern for workers with 
strong labor force attachment prior to application (Figure 4). While employment post-application for 
rejected applicants remains higher than for the full sample (70-80%), the decline in earnings is now 
larger.22 While there is an apparent rebound in earnings in the years after application, it is partly due 
to a positive age-gradient common to all workers. The evolution of employment and earnings prior 
to application is now more similar, with less of a pre-application gap between groups. Again, with 
the noted exception the pattern are very stable over time. 
Overall, we reach a different conclusion for young rejected DI applicants than we had for 
older men; their labor force attachment after application remains substantial despite significant 
losses in employment. Given that the age of applicants has continued to decline, this result will be 
important when assessing the potential work behavior of new beneficiaries and rejected applicants. 
The apparent stability in the pattern we find despite large changes in the number of young applicants 
and in the DI system suggests that current employment levels are a good guide for the future 
behavior of younger applicants. 
                                                 
22 If we only consider the median of positive earnings, workers in the full sample experience a full recovery, 
whereas those in the ‘stable’ sample suffer a loss of about 25-30% (see Appendix figure 4). However, this does not 
take into account counterfactual increases in earnings due to a common positive age-gradient. 
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 The fraction of female applicants in our sample has increased steadily from 35% in the late 
1970s to about 50% in the late 1990s (Appendix Figure 2). This increase mirrors a continuing 
increase in female labor force participation, leading to wider DI coverage among women. Female 
applicants may differ from men in a variety of ways, including their labor force history prior to 
application and the options they face in the labor market after an unsuccessful application to DI. 
Table 3 and 4 and Figure 5 replicate our analysis for older and younger women.  
 The analysis of women further helps to draw a consistent pattern of employment and 
earnings of allowed and rejected DI applicants during the period under study. Our results are best 
summarized considering Figure 5. First, rejected female applicants age 45-64 have low post-
application employment and earnings (Panels A and B). Second, for older applicants there is a 
widening gap in employment and earnings between new beneficiaries and rejected applicants prior to 
application. Third, female applicants age 30-44 maintain a substantial amount of employment after 
rejection, albeit at reduced earnings. Though earnings are low, they are non-negligible, especially for 
those with positive earnings. Fourth, the patterns just described are very stable over time. It is worth 
noting that in contrast to men, rejected female applicants have not experienced a decline in earnings 
in the early to mid 1980s.23 
 Overall, our analysis confirms results in Bound (1989) regarding a limited labor force 
attachment for older DI applicants. However, a considerable fraction of younger male and female 
applicants continue to work. We also find that rejected applicants have lower pre-application 
employment and earnings, especially in the years prior to application. It appears that economically 
less successful male and female workers are drawn to DI. 
                                                 
23 This pattern, shown in Appendix Figure 3 (Panels C and D), is perhaps not surprising given increasing 
participation of women during this period (automatically increasing average earnings in the years prior to 
application). An increase in the gap between rejected female applicants and new beneficiaries starts to appear in the 
1990s.  
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4.  Employment and Earnings of Rejected DI Applicants by Earnings Class, Industry, 
and Impairment Group 
 Tables 1-4 reveal considerable heterogeneity among DI applicants. If this translates into 
different earnings after application, rejected applicants as a group may not yield a meaningful 
counterfactual for employment behavior. Similarly, it would be helpful to know whether there are 
exceptions to the general employment and earnings pattern we just described, or whether they are 
dominated by any particular sub-group of applicants. For this purpose, we exploited the sample size 
of our administrative data and replicated our analysis for several relevant sub-groups.24 
 The first sub-groups we considered were workers whose average annual earnings in the four 
year prior to the relevant baseline (1982, 1987, or 1992) were above or below the median. This is 
interesting because low-wage workers face higher replacement rates from DI, and lack of labor 
market opportunities is itself a criterion in the adjudication of DI claims. Figure 7 and Table 5 show 
earnings and employment before and after application for males; for ease of exposition, we take 
averages over application years spanning 1982 to 1997.25 Considering Figure 7, we find that among 
rejected applicants, low-earners experience a larger pre-application decline in employment and 
earnings, especially for older men. On the other hand, rejected high-earners lose part of their 
earnings-premium vis-à-vis low-earners (all of it for older men). These patterns confirm that low-
earning applicants may be driven to DI because of their economic situation. We also find that for 
both groups, labor force attachment of rejected applicants is quite low for older men, and reduced 
but non-negligible for younger men. This confirms that the patterns found in the main section are 
not driven by applicants coming from a particular range of the income distribution. 
                                                 
24 For the sake of brevity we limit our discussion to men. The patterns for women are summarized in Table 6. 
25 We take the average over application years 1982-1997, weighted by the group size. We have analyzed our three 
groups of application years separately as well, finding again that the pattern is stable over time. The only exception 
is an increase of employment and earnings for both groups in 1992-97. 
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Figure 8 shows the evolution employment and earnings for male applicants whose main 
employment prior to application to DI was in manufacturing or services.26 The comparison is 
relevant because manufacturing is a traditionally high-wage sector with declining employment and 
used to be a employer of middle- and lower-skilled older men. Employment in the service sector has 
been growing, partly absorbing low-skill employment at lower wages. Despite these differences, the 
patterns are surprisingly similar between these sectors, and similar to what we found in the main 
analysis. Employment before and after application is largely the same; it falls more strongly prior to 
application for rejected applicants, and is low for older and non-negligible for younger rejected 
applicants after application. As expected, earnings levels prior to application are higher for both 
allowed and rejected applicants coming from manufacturing; again, this results in considerably larger 
earnings losses for high-wage applicants after an unsuccessful application. The overall picture is one 
of similarity between applicants from the two main industry groups, independently of whether we 
consider older or younger applicants.27 
Perhaps the most interesting comparison is between applicants in different impairment 
groups; the current sample includes applicants whose different impairments suggest very different 
potential labor force attachment. For example, average health and ability to work may differ 
significantly between rejected applicants whose primary impairment was mental health or circulatory 
conditions. Similarly, adjudication of the severity of disability and a worker’s potential gainful activity 
is much clearer in some groups (e.g., neoplasms) than in others (e.g., musculoskeletal conditions). 
This is reflected in the rejection rate and the rate at which rejected workers appeal, and is likely to 
                                                 
26 The classification we use is 1-digit 1980 Standard Industry Code (SIC). We analyzed the industry distribution 
among allowed and denied applicants and its evolution over time, and did not find noticeable differences or changes 
at the 1-digit level. 
27 We have analyzed changes over time as well without finding noticeable differences. This of course does not imply 
there may be important developments in more narrowly defined industries during particular time periods (e.g., 
Black, Daniel, and Sanders 2002).  
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have an impact on the average type of rejected claimants. How these different factors influence 
labor force attachment is hard to predict ex-ante.28 
Figures 9 and 10 display the development of earnings and employment for male applicants in 
the most relevant impairment classes; Table 5 presents corresponding summary statistics. Figure 9 
shows patterns for applicants with mental health and musculoskeletal conditions, the two most 
common impairments for all age-groups. Figure 10 shows the most common age-specific 
impairments – neoplasms and circulatory system for older applicants, injuries and circulatory system 
conditions for younger applicants.  
To summarize, all the main patterns we have found so far are replicated within impairment 
classes. Especially among older applicants, the behavior of both allowed and rejected applicants 
between impairment codes is surprisingly similar, with at best nuanced differences. For younger 
applicants, we see some differences in overall earnings levels as might be expected; for example, 
rejected applicants with mental health conditions have lower average employment and earnings 
before and after application than applicants with musculoskeletal conditions (Figure 9, Panel D). 
Similarly, rejected workers applying to DI because of an injury fare better after application than, say, 
workers applying because of conditions affecting the circulatory system. 
One of the factors behind reductions in employment after an unsuccessful application to DI 
may be the health status of rejected applicants. On average rejected applicants have substantially 
lower mortality rates after application than new beneficiaries, but higher mortality rates than non-
applicants (Figure 6). However, this difference is unlikely to be large enough to explain employment 
gaps between rejected applicants and the overall population. Table 7 shows that there are some 
important differences in mortality by impairment class. On average, impairment groups with lower 
                                                 
28 On the one hand, those applicants rejected in an easy-to-screen impairment class such as neoplasms should be of 
better health than workers in hard-to-screen impairments (where the probability of mistake is higher); on the other 
hand, workers in the latter group might be more healthy to begin with, and the uncertainty in the screening process 
might further attract applications from healthier individuals. 
 20 
mortality tend to have somewhat higher employment rates. However, the magnitude of the 
employment decline appears too large and too uniform across impairment groups to be explained by 
differential declines in health status. Instead, it is likely that once applicants have left the labor force 
and satisfied the work requirement of a DI application, an important fraction never returns to work. 
5.  Sensitivity Analysis – The Role of Age- and Year-Trends By Group 
To fully assess the decline in employment and earnings rejected applicants experience after 
application, we need to take into account the expected evolution of their employment and earnings 
had they not exited the labor market and applied to the Disability Insurance program. In the absence 
of a group of individuals who exactly match the observed and unobserved characteristics of rejected 
applicants, in the following we use our administrative data to provide an approximate control group. 
Specifically, we compare the evolution of employment and earnings for rejected applicants to the 
career outcomes of a random sample of individuals not applying to SSDI who had similar prior 
average annual earnings, were of similar age, and worked in the same industry. This approach also 
allows us to control explicitly for the pre-application differences in average earnings, age, or industry 
between rejected and allowed applicants themselves. 
To implement the comparison, we estimated a series of regression models similar to the 
dynamic difference-in-difference regressions estimated by Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan (1993) 
for the event of job loss and by Krueger and Kruse (1995) for the event of spinal chord injury. Let 
ity  stand for either annual employment (a dummy for positive earnings in a given year) or annual 
earnings (in $1000 deflated by the CPI at 2000 prices). Then we estimate the following distributed 
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where i indexes individuals and t  indexes calendar years; itX captures individual characteristics; the 
dummies kitD  indicate the k-th year before or after application to disability; and iALD  and iDEN  
are dummies for whether an individual i is an allowed or rejected disability applicant.29 The 
parameter kδ  ( kβ  ) measures the change in employment or earnings of allowed (rejected) applicants 
in the k-th year before and after application to DI relative to the baseline and relative to the change 
over time for non-applicants (captured by unrestricted year dummies tθ ). In addition, all of our 
models include a fourth order polynomial in both current age and average annual earnings during 
the baseline period. The models were estimated separately by gender and by broad age groups. 
To address the concern that remaining heterogeneity among rejected applicants, new 
beneficiaries, and non-applicants may affect our comparison, we extended our base model in several 
ways. First, we included effects for two digit industry of the baseline job, effects for the employer of 
the baseline job, and effects for earnings class to make sure that the comparison is not affected by 
differences in economic background of allowed and rejected workers. Second, we replaced the single 
time trend by interactions of year-dummies with two digit baseline industry, earnings class, and 
earnings class-industry groups. This ensures that the comparison of the evolution of earnings and 
employment of allowed and rejected workers is made with workers in similar industry or earnings 
cells. 
The estimates of kδ  and kβ   for this final specification for older and younger men are 
shown in Figure 11.30 The figures suggests that controlling for pre-application differences in earnings 
and age, and to a certain extent industry, sharpens our results in Sections 2 and 3 based on a simple 
comparison of averages. In particular, the regression results confirm that, with the exception of 
                                                 
29 The model is estimated using only finally rejected applicants, initially allowed applicants, and non-applicants. 
Including those applicants that were initially rejected and finally were awarded benefits did not substantially alter 
the results. This latter group is discussed in the next section. 
30 The results for older and younger women, shown in Figure 12, contain the same messages. 
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changes in pre-application earnings, the evolution of employment and earnings before and after 
application has been stable over time. The regression results also help to draw out more clearly the 
pre-application declines in employment and earnings for older rejected disability applicants.  
Second, introducing a comparison group of non-applicants leads to the impression of a 
recovery in employment and earnings for older disability applicants. To explore what lies behind 
these patterns, Appendix Figure 7A displays annual employment rates and average earnings for non-
applicants, rejected applicants, and initially allowed beneficiaries. The apparent recovery in Figure 11 
can be attributed to a negative age-gradient in employment and earnings in the overall population, 
and is thus to a certain degree mechanical (e.g., the line for allowed applicants would slope upwards 
even if their employment were always zero). 
Third, introducing a control group makes a more important difference for younger disability 
applicants. In particular, the recovery in average annual earnings for rejected applicants after 
application apparent from basic averages (Figure 3 or Appendix Figure 4 for positive earnings) 
disappears when we control for age and year trends of similar non-applicants. Thus, compared to 
individuals of similar age, gender, average earnings, and industry, rejected applicants bear substantial 
losses in both total annual earnings (Figure 11 or 12) and positive annual earnings (Appendix Figure 
8). The upward earnings trend among non-applicants that delivers this result is shown in Appendix 
Figure 7B. 
To summarize the regression results shown in the figures and display standard errors, we 
follow Jacobson et al. (1993) and Krueger and Kruse (1995) and impose a parsimonious but flexible 
functional form on the evolution of employment and earnings before and after application. This 
parameterization also gives us a convenient way to assess differences in the comparison between 
allowed and rejected workers across groups (e.g., by industry or education), and to test for the 
significance of these differences. 
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Specifically, we split the pattern into a dip prior to application, a drop during application, and 
a recovery following application. Thereby, the ‘dip’ is captured by a variable that is a linear trend -5 
to -2 years prior to application and zero elsewhere; the ‘drop’ is captured by a dummy that is equal 
to one starting two years after application and zero before; the ‘recovery’ is captured by a variable 
that is linear starting three years after application and zero elsewhere. To obtain an estimate of the 
difference of allowed and rejected workers with respect to non-applicants, instead of a main effect 

















































where we are particularly interested in the difference in the patterns of base, dip, drop, or recovery 
for allowed and rejected workers, over time, and across sub-samples of the population. These are 
captured by the two quadruplets of parameters  ( )3210 ,,, δδδδ  and ( )3210 ,,, ββββ . 
Tables 8 and 9 display the parameter estimates and corresponding standard errors for the 
sample of older and younger men, respectively (Appendix Tables 1 and 2 show the corresponding 
results for older and younger women). To help assess the impact of the regression controls, the 
tables also display the effects without covariates. The estimated baseline differences relative to non-
applicants clearly show the need to control for pre-application differences in employment and 
earnings among applicant groups and non-applicants. Once this is done, overall the numbers in the 
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table confirm the results obtained from Figures 11 and 12 of estimates of annual dummies before 
and after application. We conclude that the results from the descriptive section are robust to 
including a control group of non-applicants and narrowing the comparison among groups of 
applicants with similar pre-application earnings and industry affiliation. However, we also find that 
ignoring age-related trends in earnings would risk misstating some of the pattern, especially for 
younger workers. 
 Finally, we extended the model in equation (2) by interacting the base dip, drop, and 
recovery coefficients with dummies indicating additional worker characteristics. For simplicity, we 
focus on binary sample characteristics; denote these by jitE , where j indexes a characteristic. Then 




















































where the interactions between the characteristics and base, dip, drop, and recovery measures 
capture the difference in the comparison of allowed and rejected before and after application across 
groups. We include interactions with a dummy for non-white, for education beyond high school, for 
baseline earnings greater than the median, and for baseline industry equal to manufacturing or 
services. We first include each additional characteristic separately, and then pool all interactions in a 
single model. In the following, we only present results from the pooled model. 
The results for the pooled model are shown in Tables 10 and 11. Table 10 shows the results 
for our sample of men age 45-64 at baseline when interactions with dummies for high education 
(more than high school), high earnings (more than median annual earnings at baseline), and 
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manufacturing (work in manufacturing at baseline) are included jointly in the regressions. Table 11 
shows the same results for younger men. 
A few notable results stand out. First, Table 10 confirms that both allowed and rejected 
high-earning applicants to DI have less of a drop in employment prior to application, and smaller 
drops in employment at the date of the application. However, they have larger pre-declines in 
earnings and much larger instant drops in earnings at the actual time of application.  This difference 
is particularly pronounced for allowed workers until 1992, when the losses of allowed and rejected 
high earners are similar. These patterns are stable across years and robust to the inclusion of other 
interactions.31 It appears high earners are less likely to lose their job before applying to DI, but are 
subject to substantial earnings losses prior to and at application. Second, a similar pattern of 
differential losses at application holds for highly educated applicants, albeit the differences are 
smaller and decline over time. In the years after 1987, rejected highly educated applicants do not 
experience significantly larger earnings losses (but keep an employment advantage).  Third, workers 
applying from manufacturing have much smaller and barely significant advantages in terms of 
employment. Only the difference for allowed workers is significant, suggesting that workers 
previously working in manufacturing are more likely to engage in some form of activity once 
receiving benefits. Last, we have also estimated regression models for workers applying to DI in 
1987-1992 and 1992-1997 where we included interactions between the DIP, DROP, and REC 
variables and the largest impairment groups (see Appendix Tables 3 and 4). Although the results are 
somewhat noisy, they tend to confirm the impression from the descriptive analysis that differences 
between impairment groups, although present, are not large. Once we condition on differences by 
earnings class or sector, hardly any of the differences are statistically significant. 
                                                 
31 We have also included interactions with a service dummy or a non-white dummy. The former showed no 
significant difference in the effects; the latter suggests earnings losses are lower but employment losses are higher 
for non-whites allowed applicants relative to the main effect (there is no differences for denied non-white 
applicants). 
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6.  The Characteristics of Initially Rejected New Beneficiaries  
A large and growing fraction of individuals whose applications are initially rejected during 
the administrative phase of the disability review process are awarded benefits during the judicial 
review of their cases.32 These are workers whose disability neither corresponds exactly nor is 
equivalent to a list of common impairments; they are also deemed to be able to find equivalent pre-
disability employment during the initial screening. It is thus natural to ask whether these 
beneficiaries would be more likely to work in the absence of DI. In particular, finally rejected 
applicants might constitute a better counterfactual for these beneficiaries, since they can be more 
rightly considered “on the margin” of receiving DI or not. This section briefly discusses the 
characteristics of these “reversed” applicants, and discusses how they can be used to construct 
counterfactual employment figures for disability beneficiaries. 
Tables 1 through 4 show that initially rejected new beneficiaries have much lower mortality 
rates than immediately allowed beneficiaries. Indeed, their mortality is much closer to (and 
sometimes lower than) that of rejected applicants. This derives partly from the fact that a high 
fraction applies for DI because of conditions affecting the musculoskeletal system. In fact, the 
majority of new beneficiaries with musculoskeletal conditions are initially rejected (e.g., Table 1). 
Appendix figure 5 shows that “reversals” have somewhat lower average earnings prior to application 
than regular new beneficiaries, especially during the 1990s. Yet, their earnings are always higher than 
that of finally rejected applicants. Similarly, their employment and earnings do not dip prior to 
application as in the case of rejected applicants (Appendix figure 6). Initially rejected new 
                                                 
32 The fraction of initially denied new beneficiaries was 30% (40%) for 30-44 (45-54) year old men in the early 
1980s, and 40% (60%) from the late 1980s onwards (Appendix figure 5). The current figures for the older age group 
do not include 55-64 year olds, but the pattern including older workers are very similar (the figures were being 
generated when the working paper went into press for the RRC conference). 
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beneficiaries look more like regular new beneficiaries rather than finally rejected applicants in terms 
of their pre-application employment dynamics.33 
Overall, the decline in average pre-application earnings and the low post-application 
mortality rate suggests that some initially rejected new beneficiaries may be economically motivated. 
Yet, they clearly distinguish themselves from finally rejected applicants in terms of both earnings 
level and employment dynamics prior to application. Thus, we believe it is fair to say that while the 
evidence is perhaps suggestive, we cannot say we have found a smoking gun indicating that a 
majority of initially rejected new beneficiaries are induced to apply to DI because of economic 
conditions. 
6.1  A Counterfactual Exercise Based on Initially Rejected New Beneficiaries and 
Finally Rejected Applicants 
Whatever the conclusion from the foregoing analysis, the fact that their applications of 
initially rejected new beneficiaries were rejected in the first stages of the disability review process 
implies that their health status and employment potential were deemed better than that of the typical 
new beneficiary. This and similar mortality rates indicate that the employment behavior of finally 
rejected applicants may be a better counterfactual for potential employment of initially rejected new 
beneficiaries than for regular new beneficiaries. Yet, if we attach at least some significance to the 
outcome of the judicial review, we can assume that the employment potential of the majority of 
initially rejected new beneficiaries is lower than that of finally rejected applicants. 
Based on these considerations, in the following we treat the proportion of initially rejected 
new beneficiaries as an estimate of the fraction of all new beneficiaries that are “on the margin” of 
                                                 
33 For two to three years after application, their employment and earnings remain higher than that of immediately 
allowed new beneficiaries; this is likely to be due to the fact that our way of measuring final benefit receipt (through 
entries in the Master Beneficiary Record), is not able to exclude applicants who work after their first application is 
denied and then re-apply successfully in the course of a few years. 
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receiving DI; it is reasonable to assume that these beneficiaries are the ones most likely to exhibit 
some labor force attachment in the absence of DI. To predict employment in the absence of DI, we 
follow Bound (1989) and use the work behavior of finally rejected applicants as an upper bound for 
the employment rate of this group. The counterfactual employment rate of new beneficiaries in 
different age or gender groups is then easily calculated as  
{ }





For example, according to Appendix figure 5, in the 1990s about 40% of all new 
beneficiaries among men age 45-54 were initially rejected. Based on this fraction and average post-
application employment of rejected applicants from Figure 3, the potential employment rate for this 
age-group would be at most 8% (20% times 40%). For younger male applicants, the comparable 
fraction would be at most 21% (30% times 70%). Clearly, these numbers can be no more than 
approximate, not least because a proper counterfactual would take into account pre-application 
differences in earnings and employment. Nevertheless, this exercise gives a useful indication of the 
orders of magnitude involved. Overall, the predicted potential employment rates of new 
beneficiaries appear very low for older workers; although an order of magnitude greater, they cannot 
be called large for younger applicants. 
An obvious drawback and limitation of this approach is that it understates employment 
behavior of those new beneficiaries that were immediately awarded benefits. While these applicants 
were either of lower health or were deemed to not be able to pursue a substantial gainful activity, 
some of them may nevertheless be able to work. One approach to incorporate their employment 
into the counterfactual just constructed is to use the actually observed employment rate of initially 
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awarded new beneficiaries. This is likely constitutes a lower bound of these beneficiaries’ work 
potential.  
{ }
{ } { }
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Again eyeballing Figure 3, we would obtain as counterfactual employment rates 
Men Age 45-64: (20% * 40%) + (10% * 60%) = 8% + 6.0% = 14% 
Men Age 30-44: (30% * 70%) + (20% * 30%) = 21% + 6.0% = 27% 
These numbers are higher than what we had before, but still relatively low. Given our treatment of 
initially awarded beneficiaries, these numbers should probably be treated as lower bounds. However, 
they are indicative of how the approximation introduced by Bound can be affected by disaggregating 
the group of new beneficiaries into more specific groups about whose potential labor force status 
additional information is available. 
There are two ways to interpret these simple counterfactuals. First, they can be viewed as 
counterfactual employment for new beneficiaries in the absence of the DI system altogether; this 
would be in the spirit of Bound’s (1989) original interpretation. Such an interpretation requires that 
the low employment rate of rejected applicant is due to bad health or due to generally low labor 
market prospects, but not due to factors associated with the application to DI itself. A second 
interpretation views the counterfactual as prediction of what would happen in the case of a rejection 
or termination of benefits of a new beneficiary. In this case, it does not matter what affects 
employment of rejected applicants; in particular, the application process itself could lower their 
employment prospects. 
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In the second case, counterfactual employment rates in the absence of DI altogether would 
likely be higher than what is predicted above for two reasons. First, counterfactual employment rates 
of new beneficiaries would probably be predicted to be higher had they never gone through the DI 
application process; given that the predicted fraction of new beneficiaries deemed “on the margin” is 
below 50% (Appendix figure 5), this is unlikely to make a very big difference.34 Second, in this 
scenario in the absence of DI a higher fraction of rejected applicants would work as well. How big 
the effect of the application process for DI itself is on labor force participation is difficult to answer 
without more detailed information on health or random assignment of the decision to apply for DI. 
The point of this discussion is twofold. First, because we only consider initially rejected new 
beneficiaries as an estimate of beneficiaries “on the margin” of working, in neither scenario is a high 
fraction of new beneficiaries likely to work. Due to this approach the counterfactual employment 
rates we presented are also lower than those implied by Bound (1989). Second, a full account of the 
employment effects of the DI system would benefit from a closer analysis of rejected applicants. On 
the one hand, it is likely that the DI application process itself imposes a significant cost on rejected 
workers and on society in terms of lost employment and earnings. On the other hand, it implies that 
the employment effects of DI could be reduced by inducing rejected applicants to return to the 
labor force. This may yield more cost-effective ways of limiting potential adverse effects of DI on 
employment rates of workers who would be in the labor force were it not for a potentially 
unsuccessful application to DI. 
                                                 
34 E.g., numbers in Figure 3 Panel B for younger male workers show that employment in prior to DI is about 85%, 
implying an employment rate of 25.5% (30% times 85%) in the absence of DI, an improvement of 4.5% relative to 
the previous counterfactual of 21%. From Panel A, for older male workers the new counterfactual upper-bound 
employment rate would be 36% (40% times 80%), an bigger increase vis-à-vis the initial counterfactual; however, 
this number does not take into account the negative age-gradient in employment rates during that period, and is still 
lower than Bound’s original estimates. 
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7. Changes in Age-Composition and Potential Employment of New Beneficiaries 
 Although employment of single groups of rejected applicants appears roughly stable from 
the early 1980s to the mid-1990s, there has been a marked change in the characteristics of applicants. 
Among others, applicants have become younger and more affected by impairments with lower 
mortality, such as musculoskeletal conditions. Some of these composition changes imply that even 
though within each group of new beneficiaries’ predicted employment – as approximated by 
employment of rejected applicants – is stable, predicted employment potential of new beneficiaries 
as a group may have been rising over time.  
 To see this directly, we can aggregate the Bound counterfactual for employment for each 
age-group g to a counterfactual for all new beneficiaries te~  using the shares of each age group 
iesBeneficiar New
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This decomposition highlights that both changes in group-specific shares and changes in group-
specific employment rates will affect the counterfactual employment rate for new beneficiaries. The 
decomposition also suggests that a straightforward way to assess the role of changes in the age 
distribution over time is to recalculate the counterfactuals holding age shares constant at the level of 





Applicant Rejected( ). The difference between the two measures 
te~ and te
(  indicates the role of changes in the age-distribution to potential employment of new 
beneficiaries. 
 To implement this decomposition, we calculated the fraction of years worked in the five 
years after application for rejected male applicants by year of application and age-group. We 
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then generated te~ and te
(  as just explained. The shares in te
(  are thereby held constant at the level 
in 1981. Figure 13 displays the results. The first line from the top is simply the average 5-year 
employment rate for all rejected applicants. It is higher than the second line te~  (representing the 
sum of age-group-specific employment rates weighted by the population age-shares among new 
beneficiaries) since on average new beneficiaries are older than rejected applicants, and older 
workers are predicted to work less (e.g., see Tables 1 and 2).  
The third line from the top shows the same measure when we hold age-shares constant at 
their 1981 level ( te
( ). It is lower than the second line ( te~ ), since the fraction of young beneficiaries 
has been increasing over time. Not taking into account for this increase, we would underestimate 
potential employment of new beneficiaries according to the Bound approximation. The 
difference between the second and third line shows the degree of the underestimation. The 
difference is substantial, indicating that not taking into account of composition changes and only 
focusing on developments within groups one would miss an important part of the story. Were we 
to ignore changes in the age composition of new beneficiaries, we would conclude that potential 
employment behavior was roughly stable from the early 1980s to the early 1990s, and not rising 
until the mid to late 1990s. However, Figure 13 shows that changes in the age-composition have 
led to a rising potential employment rate already starting in the mid-1980s. 
8. Conclusion  
We have used administrative data comprising earnings, impairment, and mortality 
information for a sample of DI applicants and non-applicants covering 1978 to 2004 to replicate and 
extend Bound’s (1989) seminal analysis of rejected DI applicants. We confirm Bound’s main result 
that the constituency typically served by DI – men age 45-64 – does not have substantial 
employment after rejection. This holds independently of gender, industry, prior wage or impairment 
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type. It also holds for workers with very similar prior employment history, and is thus unlikely to be 
driven by pre-application differences in earnings and employment. We also show that these patterns 
are very stable over time. Thus, with respect to older male applicants, Bound’s original conclusion 
holds; it appears unlikely that their employment rate would rise significantly in the absence of federal 
DI. 
However, our further results suggest one has to be careful not to generalize from this group 
to all new DI beneficiaries. An increasing fraction of DI applicants is younger than 45 and in better 
health. We show that these applicants maintain substantial labor force attachment after rejection, 
albeit at a lower rate than before application. Thus, for younger DI beneficiaries, we cannot exclude 
potentially substantial labor force attachment based on rejected applicants. If rejected applicants 
constitute an upper bound, this bound is substantial. Yet, we have also argued that the importance 
of this finding depends on who among new beneficiaries is deemed as most likely to be “on the 
margin” between receiving and not receiving DI. In the paper, we have exploited the institutional 
features of the process of determination of benefit eligibility to use the fraction of new beneficiaries 
who were initially rejected as an estimate of such “marginal” applicants. Even though a substantial 
and increasing fraction of new beneficiaries had their applications rejected initially, the resulting 
counterfactual for labor force participation of younger new beneficiaries is again low. 
We also found signs that economically less successful workers are drawn to apply to DI. A 
substantial fraction of these workers appear to be screened out during the application process; this 
results in rejected applicants having lower pre-application earnings and employment than new 
beneficiaries. The gap increases in the years prior to application, and is larger for older applicants. 
This evidence appears to confirm that DI leads low-wage workers to leave the labor force and apply 
to DI. Since rejected applicants bear considerable losses in employment and earnings, this process 
imposes substantial costs on these workers and on society as a whole in terms of lost output. 
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The large losses in average employment and earning at application that we find suggest that 
the application to DI in itself may be costly for workers. From a labor economics perspective, the 
temporary but substantial departure from the labor force that an application requires could well 
explain part of the substantial losses we find. In this case, using employment of rejected applicants 
as an upper bound makes a statement about counterfactual employment of new beneficiaries were 
they rejected, not of their employment in the absence of DI altogether. This also implies that the 
exclusive focus on new beneficiaries when trying to understand the employment effects of DI may 
miss part of the story. Those more at risk of being drawn out of the labor force by DI are workers 
on the margin between receiving and not receiving DI; our finding suggests many of these 
applicants end up rejected and without a job.
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Figure 2, Panel A: Average Annual Earnings Pre−Application of All DI Applicants,
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Figure 2, Panel B: Average Annual Earnings Pre−Application of All DI Applicants,
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Figure 3: Average Annual Employment and Earnings for Allowed and Rejected
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Figure 4: Average Annual Employment and Earnings for Allowed and Rejected
Male DI Applicants Before and After Application for Disability Insurance
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Figure 5: Average Annual Employment and Earnings for Allowed and Rejected
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Figure 6: Fraction Dying After Application for Disability Insurance
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Figure 7: Average Annual Employment and Earnings for Allowed and Rejected
Male DI Applicants Before and After Application for Disability Insurance
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Figure 8: Average Annual Employment and Earnings for Allowed and Rejected
Male DI Applicants Before and After Application for Disability Insurance
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Figure 9: Average Annual Employment and Earnings for Allowed and Rejected
Male DI Applicants Before and After Application for Disability Insurance
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Source: 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text).
Figure 10: Average Annual Employment and Earnings for Allowed and Rejected
Male DI Applicants Before and After Application for Disability Insurance
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Panel D: Difference in Annual Earnings ($1000) Relative to Non−Applicants, Age 30−44
Source: 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text). Regression specification includes a quartic in
age, a quartic in baseline average annual earnings, and year dummies interacted with ten dummies for earnings
class prior to application and twelve industry dummies (see text for details).
Figure 11: Difference in Employment and Earnings Between Allowed or Rejected
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Figure 12: Difference in Employment and Earnings Between Allowed or Rejected
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Figure 13: Employment of New Male DI Beneficiaries Predicted by Employment
of Rejected Applicants, Age Shares of Rejected Applicants (’Original’)
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Panel C: Total Number of Rejected Applicants
Source: 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text). Numbers from 831 File only refer to initial applicants.
Appendix Figure 1: Total Number of Applicants, New Beneficiaries and Rejected
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Appendix Figure 2: Average Characteristics of Allowed and Rejected Applicants
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Appendix Figure 3: Number of Applicants and Average Annual Earnings Before Application
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Appendix Figure 4: Median Positive Annual Earnings for Initial Allowed and Final Rejected
Male DI Applicants Before and After Application for Disability Insurance
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Panel D: Annual Earnings ($1000) for Init. Rejected and Later Allowed (Reversals), Age 30−44
Source: 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text).
Appendix Figure 5: Role of Initially Rejected and Later Allowed Applicants, Fraction 
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Appendix Figure 6: Average Annual Employment and Earnings for Allowed and Rejected
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Panel C: Average Annual Positive Earnings by Year
Source: 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text). The figure shows two lines for non−applicants,
corresponding to two cohorts in the relevant age−range in 1982 and 1992.
Appendix Figure 7A: Trends in Employment and Earnings for Men Age 45−64
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Source: 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text). The figure shows two lines for non−applicants,
corresponding to two cohorts in the relevant age−range in 1982 and 1992.
Appendix Figure 7B: Trends in Employment and Earnings for Men Age 30−44
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Source: 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text). Regression specification includes a quartic in
age, a quartic in baseline average annual earnings, and year dummies interacted with ten dummies for earnings
class prior to application and twelve industry dummies (see text for details).
Appendix Figure 8: Difference in Positive Earnings Between Allowed or Rejected
































Labor Supply and Earnings 2 Years After Application
Percent Positive Covered Earnings 73.3 40.4 9.6 25.4 75.9 48.1 12.9 27.3 78.0 44.8 14.8 28.0
Percent Earnings Above Minimum Amount(a) 70.2 31.6 6.3 18.4 72.4 38.4 8.7 20.7 73.6 36.6 8.6 19.4
Average Annual Earnings 34759 6672 1254 3785 38888 8367 1287 4099 39153 5838 1470 3284
| Median Positive Annual Earnings 37000 10000 4500 8000 37000 8000 5000 9000 35000 8000 4000 5000
Demographics
Median Age at Application 52 55 56 52 52 54 56 51 50 52 55 50
Percent Non-White 11.1 20.6 14.3 17.8 12.0 16.6 17.8 19.4 14.9 26.8 18.9 19.9
Median Years of Schooling -- -- -- -- -- 11 12 10 -- 12 12 12
Percent with Health Condition
Muscuskeletal System -- -- -- -- -- 27.2 9.9 29.9 -- 32.2 18.0 38.5
Circulatory System -- -- -- -- -- 20.8 28.7 28.6 -- 16.7 24.6 19.2
Mental Disorders/Nervous System -- -- -- -- -- 15.0 15.5 11.5 -- 14.3 18.1 13.5
Respiratory System -- -- -- -- -- 7.2 8.5 5.9 -- 4.5 7.5 5.0
Digestive System -- -- -- -- -- 3.2 2.3 1.8 -- 3.1 1.7 1.7
Genitourinary System -- -- -- -- -- 0.6 1.2 0.0 -- 0.0 1.6 0.3
Neoplasms -- -- -- -- -- 2.6 22.7 2.8 -- 2.3 17.7 3.1
Metabolic -- -- -- -- -- 5.5 4.3 3.8 -- 5.2 2.6 3.3
Infectuous Diseases -- -- -- -- -- 1.2 0.4 0.0 -- 0.9 3.2 0.3
Injuries -- -- -- -- -- 7.8 3.7 7.9 -- 11.7 3.3 8.1
Other, Missing -- -- -- -- -- 9.0 2.9 7.7 -- 6.8 1.8 6.8
Fraction Dead 2 Years After Application 4.5 7.6 34.8 4.4 3.9 8.3 33.3 2.3 3.1 4.9 24.3 2.9
Fraction Dead 4 Years After Application 6.1 11.9 42.9 9.7 5.4 12.0 40.6 8.4 4.4 8.0 33.0 7.6
Number of Obsevations 151945 582 961 472 153600 349 751 392 170520 426 1465 578
Table 1: Employment, Earnings, and Other Characteristics of Rejected Disability Insurance Applicants, New Beneficiaries, and Non-Applicants (Men, Age 45-64)
Notes:  Earnings are in 2000 dollars adjusted by the CPI. Applications refer to initial application to receive benefits from Social Security Disability Insurance (DI). "Rejected applicants" are those applicants that 
are rejected in the administrative stage of the screening process and do not receive benefits within ten years of initial applicatoin."New Beneficiaries" are those applicants that are awarded benefits in the 
administrative stage of the screening process. "Initially Rejected New Beneficiaries" are those applicants that are rejected in the administrative stage of the screening process but receive benefits within ten years of 
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1982 1987 1992






























Labor Supply and Earnings 2 Years After Application
Percent Positive Covered Earnings 82.9 59.8 25.0 41.4 86.7 70.9 20.2 35.9 86.0 59.7 22.0 30.8
Percent Earnings Above Minimum Amount(a) 79.5 50.7 13.8 25.6 83.5 55.8 9.9 25.3 82.2 44.6 12.4 21.0
Average Annual Earnings 36725 10393 2702 5541 39333 10751 1933 3512 35997 6387 1940 3712
Median Positive Annual Earnings 37000 10000 2000 5000 36000 9000 2000 5000 32000 6000 3000 6000
Demographics
Median Age at Application 33 34 35 36 34 33 35 36 34 34 35 36
Percent Non-White 17.9 28.4 24.5 20.0 20.0 29.9 24.4 26.7 23.9 39.5 36.1 30.8
Median Years of Schooling -- -- -- -- -- 12 12 12 -- 12 12 12
Percent with Health Condition
Muscuskeletal System -- -- -- -- -- 31.3 5.1 38.7 -- 37.5 4.8 41.4
Circulatory System -- -- -- -- -- 3.0 8.7 8.0 -- 3.1 5.4 5.3
Mental Disorders/Nervous System -- -- -- -- -- 25.5 40.8 21.7 -- 22.3 38.5 19.7
Respiratory System -- -- -- -- -- 0.8 1.3 1.4 -- 2.5 0.4 1.5
Digestive System -- -- -- -- -- 2.2 2.6 2.8 -- 1.9 1.9 2.4
Genitourinary System -- -- -- -- -- 0.0 2.6 0.5 -- 0.1 3.6 0.4
Neoplasms -- -- -- -- -- 2.4 10.6 3.3 -- 1.1 7.6 0.4
Metabolic -- -- -- -- -- 1.4 9.3 1.4 -- 2.1 3.4 2.8
Infectuous Diseases -- -- -- -- -- 0.5 8.7 0.5 -- 1.8 27.4 4.6
Injuries -- -- -- -- -- 23.9 4.5 14.2 -- 15.9 5.2 11.8
Other, Missing -- -- -- -- -- 9.0 5.8 7.5 -- 11.7 1.6 9.6
Fraction Dead 2 Years After Application 1.3 3.6 23.5 4.2 1.1 2.2 26.3 1.4 1.1 1.5 25.0 1.7
Fraction Dead 4 Years After Application 1.7 4.9 28.6 7.0 1.5 3.8 31.4 3.7 1.5 2.9 33.2 6.1
Number of Obsevations 189920 450 196 215 229060 371 312 217 271080 719 668 458
(a) The minimum earnings threshold used corresponds to earnings from three months of full time employment at 2000 minimum wages.
Notes:  Earnings are in 2000 dollars adjusted by the CPI. Applications refer to initial application to receive benefits from Social Security Disability Insurance (DI). "Rejected applicants" are those applicants that 
are rejected in the administrative stage of the screening process and do not receive benefits within ten years of initial applicatoin."New Beneficiaries" are those applicants that are awarded benefits in the 
administrative stage of the screening process. "Initially Rejected New Beneficiaries" are those applicants that are rejected in the administrative stage of the screening process but receive benefits within ten years 
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Table 2: Employment, Earnings, and Other Characteristics of Rejected Disability Insurance Applicants, New Beneficiaries, and Non-Applicants (Men, Age 30-44)































Labor Supply and Earnings 2 Years After Application
Percent Positive Covered Earnings 68.2 33.9 6.4 34.1 73.6 43.1 15.7 29.6 75.8 44.2 15.4 24.7
Percent Earnings Above Minimum Amount(a) 62.2 24.9 5.1 24.8 67.7 30.3 10.5 22.3 69.9 32.3 9.3 16.3
Average Annual Earnings 14187 3177 550 3152 16601 4412 1109 3292 18827 5074 988 1828
Median Positive Annual Earnings 18000 6000 5000 6000 19000 7000 5000 7000 20000 7000 3000 4000
Demographics
Median Age at Application 52 55 55 52 51 54 55 52 50 51 53 50
Percent Non-White 12.5 18.2 19.0 21.1 13.5 20.2 19.5 27.1 15.2 25.6 20.3 25.4
Median Years of Schooling -- -- -- -- -- 12 12 11 -- 12 12 12
Percent with Health Condition
Muscuskeletal System -- -- -- -- -- 32.2 15.7 36.7 -- 37.2 17.0 40.2
Circulatory System -- -- -- -- -- 16.1 17.7 17.6 -- 12.1 14.1 13.0
Mental Disorders/Nervous System -- -- -- -- -- 8.6 17.7 14.5 -- 16.2 24.9 14.9
Respiratory System -- -- -- -- -- 4.5 8.6 5.2 -- 3.8 7.7 4.6
Digestive System -- -- -- -- -- 2.6 0.7 0.7 -- 1.6 1.1 1.3
Genitourinary System -- -- -- -- -- 1.9 0.9 0.7 -- 1.3 2.7 1.1
Neoplasms -- -- -- -- -- 4.9 26.4 2.8 -- 2.7 20.7 2.5
Metabolic -- -- -- -- -- 7.1 4.8 8.0 -- 6.7 6.7 6.1
Infectuous Diseases -- -- -- -- -- 0.0 0.2 0.0 -- 0.8 0.7 0.4
Injuries -- -- -- -- -- 10.1 2.3 6.6 -- 5.1 2.0 6.9
Other, Missing -- -- -- -- -- 12.0 5.0 7.3 -- 12.4 2.5 9.0
Fraction Dead 2 Years After Application 1.8 3.1 35.2 3.3 1.7 4.1 25.5 2.4 1.4 2.4 20.2 1.7
Fraction Dead 4 Years After Application 2.6 5.6 41.9 6.5 2.5 6.0 31.6 5.8 2.1 4.3 27.3 3.6
Number of Obsevations 128465 413 389 246 136040 267 440 291 160560 371 915 523
(a) The minimum earnings threshold used corresponds to earnings from three months of full time employment at 2000 minimum wages.
Notes:  Earnings are in 2000 dollars adjusted by the CPI. Applications refer to initial application to receive benefits from Social Security Disability Insurance (DI). "Rejected applicants" are those applicants that 
are rejected in the administrative stage of the screening process and do not receive benefits within ten years of initial applicatoin."New Beneficiaries" are those applicants that are awarded benefits in the 
administrative stage of the screening process. "Initially Rejected New Beneficiaries" are those applicants that are rejected in the administrative stage of the screening process but receive benefits within ten years of 
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Table 3: Employment, Earnings, and Other Characteristics of Rejected Disability Insurance Applicants, New Beneficiaries, and Non-Applicants (Women, Age 45-64)































Labor Supply and Earnings 2 Years After Application
Percent Positive Covered Earnings 76.3 61.1 21.3 35.9 82.5 63.7 30.1 39.7 82.6 62.1 24.8 36.0
Percent Earnings Above Minimum Amount(a) 69.6 42.7 17.6 23.4 76.4 47.8 15.4 25.0 76.5 44.9 14.5 20.2
Average Annual Earnings 16897 6634 2275 2854 20226 7915 2219 2864 20695 5793 1596 2579
Median Positive Annual Earnings 19000 7000 9000 3500 21000 7500 2000 4000 20000 5000 3000 3000
Demographics
Median Age at Application 33 35 35 36 34 35 36 35 34 35 36 36
Percent Non-White 17.8 25.2 21.3 30.5 19.4 29.4 19.1 30.9 22.9 33.2 27.9 31.5
Median Years of Schooling -- -- -- -- -- 12 12 12 -- 12 12 12
Percent with Health Condition
Muscuskeletal System -- -- -- -- -- 30.2 6.6 28.7 -- 33.3 7.9 36.6
Circulatory System -- -- -- -- -- 8.5 5.9 8.1 -- 3.5 4.3 5.0
Mental Disorders/Nervous System -- -- -- -- -- 16.1 42.6 25.0 -- 26.7 50.0 27.8
Respiratory System -- -- -- -- -- 6.5 0.7 2.9 -- 3.8 2.1 1.3
Digestive System -- -- -- -- -- 3.5 2.9 2.9 -- 2.1 1.9 2.2
Genitourinary System -- -- -- -- -- 0.5 3.7 1.5 -- 1.4 1.9 0.9
Neoplasms -- -- -- -- -- 1.5 19.1 2.9 -- 1.7 13.1 2.2
Metabolic -- -- -- -- -- 4.5 5.9 7.4 -- 2.4 8.8 6.6
Infectuous Diseases -- -- -- -- -- 0.5 2.9 2.2 -- 0.9 4.0 1.9
Injuries -- -- -- -- -- 15.6 2.9 9.6 -- 10.6 2.4 5.7
Other, Missing -- -- -- -- -- 12.6 6.6 8.8 -- 13.7 3.6 9.8
Fraction Dead 2 Years After Application 0.4 0.0 23.1 2.3 0.4 1.0 21.3 2.2 0.4 1.4 13.6 1.3
Fraction Dead 4 Years After Application 0.6 0.9 28.7 4.7 0.6 1.5 22.1 4.4 0.6 1.9 16.9 1.6
Number of Obsevations 163415 234 108 128 207075 201 136 136 248120 425 420 317
(a) The minimum earnings threshold used corresponds to earnings from three months of full time employment at 2000 minimum wages.
Notes:  Earnings are in 2000 dollars adjusted by the CPI. Applications refer to initial application to receive benefits from Social Security Disability Insurance (DI). "Rejected applicants" are those applicants that 
are rejected in the administrative stage of the screening process and do not receive benefits within ten years of initial applicatoin."New Beneficiaries" are those applicants that are awarded benefits in the 
administrative stage of the screening process. "Initially Rejected New Beneficiaries" are those applicants that are rejected in the administrative stage of the screening process but receive benefits within ten years of 
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Table 4: Employment, Earnings, and Other Characteristics of Rejected Disability Insurance Applicants, New Beneficiaries, and Non-Applicants (Women, Age 30-44)
Source:  1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text).
1982 1987 1992
Application Status
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Average Earnings Prior to Application
High (Above Median) 94.7 13.4 90.0 41.4 32749 4515 30940 13286
Low (Below Median) 60.7 8.6 50.3 24.3 9349 4149 6373 7553
Primary Health Condition at Application
Muscuskeletal System 86.1 14.8 75.0 39.1 27496 4097 22311 11220
Circulatory System 84.0 11.8 73.2 30.0 27827 4386 25221 10532
Mental Disorders/Nervous System 83.5 15.4 69.6 33.4 25802 4140 16956 9883
Respiratory System 85.1 8.4 67.1 19.0 26054 3394 17005 8442
Neoplasms 83.9 3.5 71.9 27.7 30465 6800 23394 9711
Infectuous Diseases 84.4 7.3 62.7 26.8 23336 5498 15866 11352
Injuries 84.0 15.0 77.4 46.1 24494 5804 20428 14723
Industry of Employment Prior to Application
Manufacturing 94.5 15.3 88.9 42.0 33033 3896 28654 12205
Services 89.6 12.9 81.2 36.3 23678 4292 16979 10522
Average Earnings Prior to Application
High (Above Median) 95.1 22.4 92.4 67.9 26107 8248 24946 17950
Low (Below Median) 79.7 21.0 73.8 52.7 7863 4130 5931 7867
Primary Health Condition at Application
Muscuskeletal System 89.1 23.1 84.8 62.4 19838 7702 15857 13713
Circulatory System 89.8 18.8 82.4 53.9 18357 5489 13736 12172
Mental Disorders/Nervous System 86.7 26.2 79.7 56.7 14569 3977 9716 9377
Respiratory System 88.1 19.0 80.5 48.3 14669 8297 8808 9113
Neoplasms 87.6 10.0 81.5 59.4 22633 13895 17439 17371
Infectuous Diseases 88.7 11.1 81.6 41.1 17073 4783 8517 8151
Injuries 88.2 26.6 84.9 65.6 17296 9215 13888 13686
Industry of Employment Prior to Application
Manufacturing 92.6 23.5 89.6 65.8 21157 6609 17310 13654
Services 90.2 23.9 84.1 58.5 15152 5322 9533 9721
Table 5: Employment and Earnings of Rejected Disability Insurance Applicants and New Beneficiaries by Characteristics and Different Age-Groups (Men) 
New Beneficiaries Rejected Applicants New Beneficiaries Rejected Applicants
Fraction Positive Annual Earnings Median of Positive Annual Earnings
Notes:  Earnings are in 2000 dollars adjusted by the CPI. Applications refer to initial application to receive benefits from Social Security Disability Insurance (DI). "Rejected 
applicants" are those applicants that are rejected in the administrative stage of the screening process and do not receive benefits within ten years of initial applicatoin."New 
Beneficiaries" are those applicants that are awarded benefits in the administrative stage of the screening process. "Initially Rejected New Beneficiaries" are those applicants 
that are rejected in the administrative stage of the screening process but receive benefits within ten years of application.
Before/After Application
Panel A: Male Workers Age 45-64
Panel B: Male Workers Age 30-44
Application Status
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Average Earnings Prior to Application
High (Above Median) 96.2 16.0 91.7 41.5 23229 4514 22209 11218
Low (Below Median) 80.7 11.4 64.0 29.6 8650 3568 7100 6795
Primary Health Condition at Application
Muscuskeletal System 89.2 15.7 78.6 37.2 15772 4054 12723 8254
Circulatory System 89.2 12.0 73.7 25.3 15217 3856 11708 6599
womental Disorders/Nervous System 86.9 17.1 72.3 37.0 15403 3841 12119 9061
Respiratory System 88.5 8.7 68.0 26.3 15223 3509 11701 6902
Neoplasms 89.1 5.6 76.8 33.9 17629 5970 14582 11447
Infectuous Diseases 87.7 17.1 59.0 27.3 19435 7028 19363 13842
Injuries 89.9 17.5 84.4 47.6 15180 4576 13077 9782
Industry of Employwoment Prior to Application
Manufacturing 93.9 13.6 87.5 37.7 17889 4188 15231 9067
Services 91.6 15.1 85.0 39.8 15666 4337 12200 8396
Average Earnings Prior to Application
High (Above Median) 96.1 27.5 93.6 72.5 23614 6048 22334 16464
Low (Below Median) 84.1 24.0 78.4 58.8 7442 4073 5982 7617
Primary Health Condition at Application
Muscuskeletal System 89.9 24.1 85.3 64.3 12835 5456 10241 10132
Circulatory System 90.7 25.4 82.7 53.4 12155 4594 7688 8654
womental Disorders/Nervous System 88.0 28.6 81.2 61.6 12113 3949 8926 8741
Respiratory System 85.9 18.9 84.4 54.0 9934 4100 7871 8560
Neoplasms 89.1 12.1 86.4 75.0 15573 11609 11893 17081
Infectuous Diseases 87.0 17.6 71.5 52.3 13282 5125 6549 7150
Injuries 88.8 30.4 86.4 70.0 11538 5210 9750 10758
Industry of Employwoment Prior to Application
Manufacturing 92.3 24.3 89.2 66.3 14871 4893 13240 10695
Services 90.2 27.4 86.5 66.1 12405 4955 8670 9725
Notes:  Earnings are in 2000 dollars adjusted by the CPI. Applications refer to initial application to receive benefits from Social Security Disability Insurance (DI). 
"Rejected applicants" are those applicants that are rejected in the administrative stage of the screening process and do not receive benefits within ten years of initial 
applicatoin."New Beneficiaries" are those applicants that are awarded benefits in the administrative stage of the screening process. "Initially Rejected New Beneficiaries" 
are those applicants that are rejected in the administrative stage of the screening process but receive benefits within ten years of application.
Before/After Application
Panel A: Female Workers Age 45-64
Panel B: Female Workers Age 30-44
Table 6: Employment and Earnings of Rejected Disability Insurance Applicants and New Beneficiaries by Characteristics and Different Age-Groups (Women) 
New Beneficiaries Rejected Applicants New Beneficiaries Rejected Applicants
Fraction Positive Annual Earnings Median of Positive Annual Earnings
Application Status Beneficiaries Applicants Beneficiaries Applicants
Average Earnings Prior to Application
High (Above Median) 16.3 9.3 12.2 5.1
Low (Below Median) 16.5 13.1 11.5 7.1
Primary Health Condition at Application
Muscuskeletal System 8.4 6.3 5.7 3.6
Circulatory System 21.5 13.8 18.1 9.2
Mental Disorders/Nervous System 15.2 10.6 9.2 5.6
Respiratory System 29.9 16.5 26.7 10.8
Neoplasms 11.2 16.5 13.1 10.9
Infectuous Diseases 16.1 12.8 11.4 10.5
Injuries 11.8 6.5 8.6 4.9
Industry of Employment Prior to Application
Manufacturing 16.7 9.6 10.3 5.5
Services 17.1 11.8 11.9 5.4
Average Earnings Prior to Application
High (Above Median) 8.7 3.6 5.7 1.1
Low (Below Median) 10.0 5.0 5.5 2.6
Primary Health Condition at Application
Muscuskeletal System 3.8 2.5 2.0 1.3
Circulatory System 13.9 5.5 9.6 4.5
Mental Disorders/Nervous System 7.8 5.5 4.2 2.3
Respiratory System 8.4 5.4 9.8 0.9
Neoplasms 9.7 4.7 11.1 4.9
Infectuous Diseases 18.9 12.1 12.0 8.2
Injuries 5.6 2.5 3.6 1.6
Industry of Employment Prior to Application
Manufacturing 8.6 4.0 4.5 1.5
Services 10.4 5.3 5.9 2.2
Table 7: Fraction Dead 10 Years After Application, Rejected Disability Insurance Applicants and New 
Beneficiaries by Characteristics, Different Age-Groups 
Men Women
Notes:  Earnings are in 2000 dollars adjusted by the CPI. Applications refer to initial application to receive benefits 
from Social Security Disability Insurance (DI). "Rejected applicants" are those applicants that are rejected in the 
administrative stage of the screening process and do not receive benefits within ten years of initial applicatoin."New 
Beneficiaries" are those applicants that are awarded benefits in the administrative stage of the screening process. 
"Initially Rejected New Beneficiaries" are those applicants that are rejected in the administrative stage of the 
screening process but receive benefits within ten years of application.
Panel A: Male Workers Age 45-64
































0.094 0.113 0.089 0.043 0.058 0.118 0.061 0.041 0.049 0.069 0.090 0.056
(0.031) (0.027) (0.033) (0.024) (0.033) (0.021) (0.026) (0.015) (0.024) (0.019) (0.022) (0.014)
-0.003 0.032 0.013 0.025 -0.010 0.030 0.019 0.028 -0.032 0.021 0.003 0.025
(0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
-0.294 -0.674 -0.162 -0.633 -0.370 -0.650 -0.212 -0.565 -0.366 -0.666 -0.227 -0.616
(0.044) (0.026) (0.037) (0.026) (0.040) (0.026) (0.032) (0.022) (0.031) (0.021) (0.025) (0.019)
-0.002 -0.004 0.005 0.005 -0.004 -0.008 -0.005 -0.005 0.000 -0.008 -0.001 -0.008
(0.006) (0.003) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
B. Annual Earnings ($1000)
-13.340 -5.195 -0.952 2.404 -20.165 -9.910 0.199 -0.169 -18.919 -12.717 -0.019 -0.299
(3.805) (4.439) (1.196) (1.304) (2.371) (2.386) (0.821) (0.558) (2.562) (2.482) (0.589) (0.552)
-5.245 -4.030 0.036 -0.310 -7.493 -4.153 -0.747 -0.367 -8.350 -4.845 -1.007 -0.283
(1.100) (1.012) (0.283) (0.355) (0.702) (0.718) (0.220) (0.243) (0.641) (0.670) (0.199) (0.174)
-26.515 -37.591 -12.202 -28.826 -31.472 -37.169 -11.834 -24.380 -33.338 -39.198 -17.050 -29.292
(3.322) (2.572) (1.638) (1.915) (1.894) (1.653) (1.035) (1.383) (1.775) (1.561) (1.530) (1.784)
0.160 0.004 0.484 0.643 0.122 -0.009 -0.306 -0.010 0.323 -0.026 -0.146 -0.391









Baseline Difference vs. 
Non-Applicants
Baseline Difference vs. 
Non-Applicants
Notes: Authors' calculations from 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text). The sample consists of non-applicants, finally rejected applicants, and applicants that were awarded 
benefits during the first stages of review (see text). For definitions of baseline, dip, drop, and recovery see equation (2) in the text. The full model includes a quartic in age, and a quartic in average 
earnings in the four years prior to the base year; in addition, the model includes year effects interacted with ten dummies for earnings class prior to application and twelve industry dummies. 
Standard errors clustered at the year-earnings class-industry level are in parentheses. 
Table 8: Employment and Earnings Differences Before and After Application to SSDI Relative to Non-Applicants, Effects for Initially Allowed Beneficiaries and Rejected 
Applicants, Men Age 45-64
Full Model
Application During 1982-1987




































0.070 0.083 0.055 0.050 0.036 0.066 0.061 0.052 0.064 0.095 0.068 0.049
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
0.000 0.019 0.016 0.028 -0.007 0.016 0.016 0.024 -0.007 0.020 0.017 0.025
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
-0.198 -0.606 -0.098 -0.526 -0.257 -0.655 -0.131 -0.567 -0.203 -0.615 -0.097 -0.549
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
-0.009 -0.007 -0.004 -0.001 0.002 -0.004 0.000 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
B. Annual Earnings ($1000)
-17.295 -14.738 0.230 0.565 -20.936 -16.488 0.018 -0.068 -19.560 -13.771 0.065 0.139
(0.708) (0.761) (0.230) (0.244) (0.578) (0.646) (0.141) (0.152) (0.629) (0.677) (0.133) (0.185)
-6.528 -5.623 -0.552 -0.306 -7.552 -5.601 -0.982 -0.569 -7.478 -5.275 -0.536 -0.136
(0.207) (0.222) (0.074) (0.076) (0.180) (0.193) (0.074) (0.080) (0.189) (0.204) (0.056) (0.062)
-26.427 -34.375 -12.675 -23.310 -29.310 -35.311 -13.549 -23.187 -27.126 -33.164 -12.380 -22.626
(0.658) (0.615) (0.561) (0.851) (0.535) (0.488) (0.534) (0.901) (0.571) (0.556) (0.604) (0.995)
0.146 -0.020 -0.226 -0.237 0.528 0.056 -0.267 -0.672 0.405 0.037 -0.159 -0.539















Notes: Authors' calculations from 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text). The sample consists of non-applicants, finally rejected applicants, and applicants that were awarded 
benefits during the first stages of review (see text). For definitions of baseline, dip, drop, and recovery see equation (2) in the text. The full model includes a quartic in age, and a quartic in 
average earnings in the four years prior to the base year; in addition, the model includes year effects interacted with ten dummies for earnings class prior to application and twelve industry 
dummies. Standard errors clustered at the year-earnings class-industry level are in parentheses. 
Table 9: Employment and Earnings Differences Before and After Application to SSDI Relative to Non-Applicants, Effects for Initially Allowed Beneficiaries and Rejected 
Applicants, Men Age 30-44
Full Model
Application During 1982-1987






















Main Effect Allowed 0.122 0.051 -0.481 0.004 0.37 0.46 -12.19 0.12
(0.021) (0.006) (0.021) (0.002) (1.05) (0.35) (1.17) (0.16)
Main Effect Rejected 0.151 0.024 -0.105 0.004 1.43 -0.14 -6.19 -0.07
(0.020) (0.006) (0.027) (0.004) (1.04) (0.33) (1.26) (0.15)
High Earner Allowed -0.108 -0.042 -0.184 -0.001 2.69 -0.85 -25.68 0.05
(0.018) (0.006) (0.025) (0.003) (0.96) (0.39) (1.49) (0.17)
High Earner Rejected -0.136 -0.021 -0.006 -0.003 0.82 -0.23 -11.95 -0.19
(0.020) (0.006) (0.031) (0.004) (0.97) (0.38) (1.85) (0.19)
High Education Allowed 0.150 0.020 0.101 -0.001 14.50 4.45 9.63 0.04
(0.029) (0.010) (0.039) (0.005) (1.46) (0.48) (1.45) (0.12)
High Education Rejected 0.134 0.043 0.165 -0.011 12.81 4.69 9.85 0.44
(0.033) (0.010) (0.051) (0.008) (1.48) (0.53) (2.25) (0.27)
Manufacturing Allowed -0.011 -0.003 0.018 -0.006 1.37 -0.24 -1.29 -0.02
(0.018) (0.006) (0.028) (0.003) (1.27) (0.51) (1.83) (0.18)
Manufacturing Rejected -0.034 0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.48 0.24 0.67 0.17
(0.020) (0.007) (0.033) (0.005) (1.24) (0.45) (1.95) (0.19)
Panel B: 1987-1992
Main Rejected 0.103 0.042 -0.516 0.002 -1.36 -0.89 -12.07 -0.10
(0.017) (0.005) (0.015) (0.002) (0.72) (0.24) (0.88) (0.09)
Main Allowed 0.112 0.027 -0.140 -0.001 -0.45 -0.62 -6.12 0.16
(0.019) (0.006) (0.024) (0.003) (0.71) (0.24) (0.93) (0.13)
High Earner Allowed -0.091 -0.035 -0.198 -0.007 2.31 -0.42 -26.31 0.01
(0.015) (0.005) (0.019) (0.002) (0.68) (0.28) (1.08) (0.06)
High Earner Rejected -0.083 -0.026 -0.089 0.000 1.92 -0.68 -16.46 -0.09
(0.017) (0.006) (0.030) (0.004) (0.68) (0.30) (1.27) (0.18)
High Education Allowed 0.109 0.025 0.160 -0.005 14.66 5.36 11.11 -0.25
(0.018) (0.006) (0.026) (0.003) (0.93) (0.33) (1.39) (0.10)
High Education Rejected 0.108 0.027 0.228 -0.009 16.02 4.56 14.23 0.05
(0.028) (0.008) (0.034) (0.006) (1.10) (0.38) (1.49) (0.18)
Manufacturing Allowed 0.029 0.002 0.009 0.005 0.53 0.52 0.96 -0.02
(0.015) (0.005) (0.022) (0.003) (1.01) (0.38) (1.40) (0.08)
Manufacturing Rejected -0.014 -0.004 0.008 0.006 0.31 -0.23 0.02 -0.19
(0.020) (0.007) (0.031) (0.005) (0.98) (0.36) (1.36) (0.15)
Panel C: 1992-1997
Main Rejected 0.105 0.045 -0.553 -0.006 -0.86 -0.02 -10.37 -0.19
(0.019) (0.005) (0.019) (0.003) (0.84) (0.24) (0.99) (0.13)
Main Allowed 0.099 0.008 -0.172 0.000 -0.86 -0.26 -7.21 0.70
(0.020) (0.006) (0.024) (0.004) (0.73) (0.23) (1.06) (0.37)
High Earner Allowed -0.077 -0.032 -0.133 0.000 2.69 -0.08 -26.29 0.03
(0.017) (0.005) (0.022) (0.003) (0.65) (0.24) (1.12) (0.10)
Table 10: Differences Before and After Application to SSDI Relative to Non-Applicants, Difference for Different Groups of Allowed and Rejected Applicants, Men Age 45-64 at 
Application within Five Years of Baseline, Interactions Included Jointly
Annual Earnings ($1000)Employment
High Earner Rejected -0.098 -0.009 -0.016 0.007 4.25 -0.12 -14.84 -0.07
(0.017) (0.006) (0.031) (0.005) (0.64) (0.26) (1.83) (0.29)
High Education Allowed 0.096 0.027 0.186 -0.008 13.92 3.95 8.67 -0.40
(0.021) (0.006) (0.030) (0.004) (1.48) (0.32) (1.42) (0.18)
High Education Rejected 0.146 0.038 0.171 -0.007 13.94 3.79 11.73 0.26
(0.023) (0.007) (0.037) (0.007) (1.24) (0.38) (2.04) (0.32)
Manufacturing Allowed -0.038 -0.007 0.032 0.002 -3.01 -1.02 -4.40 -0.08
(0.018) (0.005) (0.026) (0.004) (1.24) (0.42) (1.56) (0.12)
Manufacturing Rejected -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -3.92 -1.34 -2.51 -0.50
(0.020) (0.007) (0.033) (0.005) (1.20) (0.41) (1.72) (0.26)
Notes: Authors' calculations from 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text). The sample consists of non-applicants, finally rejected applicants, and applicants that were awarded benefits 
during the first stages of review (see text). Each panel reports results from a single regression estimated for applicants applying in the respective year-group. Variables included in the model were year-
dummies, a quartic in age at the baseline year, a quartic in average annual earnings in the four year prior to the baseline year, a dummy for whether the individual is non-white and classified as a high 
earner, and dummies for whether the 1-digit industry of the individual's main job prior to application. For applicants, we also include a dummy for high educated. For definitions of baseline, dip, drop, 
and recovery see equation (2) and (3) in the text.  Interactions of the baseline, dip, drop, and recovery variables with services are included in the model but not reported. Standard errors in parentheses 


















Main Effect Allowed 0.138 0.046 -0.469 0.004 2.16 0.52 -12.34 -0.36
(0.019) (0.005) (0.024) (0.003) (0.88) (0.31) (0.89) (0.10)
Main Effect Rejected 0.098 0.030 -0.057 -0.011 1.89 0.54 -5.51 -0.51
(0.017) (0.004) (0.021) (0.003) (0.84) (0.25) (0.89) (0.11)
High Earner Allowed -0.115 -0.030 -0.144 0.003 0.07 -0.92 -21.11 -0.07
(0.018) (0.005) (0.032) (0.004) (0.94) (0.38) (1.43) (0.14)
High Earner Rejected -0.088 -0.019 -0.136 0.017 1.18 -1.00 -15.54 0.33
(0.016) (0.005) (0.029) (0.004) (0.90) (0.35) (1.51) (0.16)
High Education Allowed 0.073 0.026 0.055 -0.002 10.21 3.65 6.86 0.06
(0.026) (0.008) (0.037) (0.004) (0.97) (0.39) (1.27) (0.12)
High Education Rejected 0.113 0.029 0.095 0.010 11.27 3.54 9.64 0.41
(0.026) (0.008) (0.034) (0.006) (0.95) (0.32) (1.36) (0.18)
Manufacturing Allowed -0.015 -0.014 0.027 -0.010 0.61 0.10 0.90 -0.17
(0.020) (0.006) (0.033) (0.004) (0.89) (0.34) (1.37) (0.16)
Manufacturing Rejected -0.009 -0.012 0.031 0.000 0.31 -0.10 0.17 0.19
(0.020) (0.006) (0.029) (0.004) (0.85) (0.30) (1.24) (0.13)
Panel B: 1987-1992
Main Rejected 0.092 0.039 -0.525 0.000 2.60 0.29 -11.13 -1.08
(0.013) (0.004) (0.016) (0.002) (0.73) (0.25) (0.81) (0.11)
Main Allowed 0.089 0.022 -0.100 0.000 3.59 0.40 -4.20 -0.75
(0.013) (0.004) (0.018) (0.003) (0.76) (0.27) (0.89) (0.14)
High Earner Allowed -0.069 -0.034 -0.151 -0.001 -1.92 -1.49 -24.55 0.33
(0.012) (0.004) (0.021) (0.003) (0.82) (0.35) (1.20) (0.11)
High Earner Rejected -0.054 -0.022 -0.096 0.006 -1.26 -2.51 -19.34 0.70
(0.012) (0.004) (0.025) (0.004) (1.07) (0.42) (1.45) (0.24)
High Education Allowed 0.109 0.027 0.133 -0.006 10.39 3.95 9.74 0.10
(0.019) (0.006) (0.026) (0.003) (0.90) (0.30) (1.10) (0.18)
High Education Rejected 0.093 0.031 0.140 -0.001 11.30 4.03 12.71 0.54
(0.022) (0.007) (0.029) (0.005) (0.83) (0.30) (1.17) (0.33)
Manufacturing Allowed -0.008 -0.008 -0.001 -0.002 0.23 0.07 0.41 -0.12
(0.015) (0.005) (0.024) (0.003) (0.85) (0.34) (1.20) (0.12)
Manufacturing Rejected -0.023 -0.002 0.003 0.005 -0.84 0.09 -0.52 -0.03
(0.016) (0.005) (0.026) (0.004) (0.78) (0.29) (1.08) (0.15)
Panel C: 1992-1997
Main Rejected 0.125 0.032 -0.520 0.003 1.44 0.06 -13.14 -0.62
(0.011) (0.003) (0.014) (0.002) (0.50) (0.15) (0.60) (0.08)
Main Allowed 0.117 0.016 -0.086 0.001 2.07 0.02 -6.27 -0.36
(0.010) (0.003) (0.014) (0.002) (0.45) (0.14) (0.57) (0.09)
High Earner Allowed -0.092 -0.021 -0.145 -0.004 -1.06 -0.91 -23.53 -0.03
(0.010) (0.003) (0.019) (0.003) (0.53) (0.20) (0.95) (0.10)
Table 11: Differences Before and After Application to SSDI Relative to Non-Applicants, Difference for Different Groups of Allowed and Rejected Applicants, Men Age 30-44 at 
Application within Five Years of Baseline, Interactions Included Jointly
Annual Earnings ($1000)Employment
High Earner Rejected -0.089 -0.019 -0.084 0.000 -0.97 -1.45 -16.49 0.35
(0.009) (0.003) (0.019) (0.003) (0.52) (0.21) (0.95) (0.14)
High Education Allowed 0.037 0.013 0.137 -0.003 9.73 3.65 7.62 -0.02
(0.017) (0.005) (0.024) (0.004) (0.74) (0.26) (1.01) (0.15)
High Education Rejected 0.068 0.033 0.115 0.002 10.27 3.74 9.57 0.40
(0.016) (0.005) (0.022) (0.004) (0.81) (0.28) (1.08) (0.17)
Manufacturing Allowed -0.032 -0.002 0.016 -0.003 0.62 0.62 0.31 -0.11
(0.013) (0.004) (0.022) (0.003) (0.67) (0.24) (0.97) (0.09)
Manufacturing Rejected -0.013 0.000 0.022 -0.005 0.23 0.13 -0.44 -0.12
(0.012) (0.004) (0.019) (0.003) (0.62) (0.22) (0.83) (0.10)
Notes: Authors' calculations from 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text). The sample consists of non-applicants, finally rejected applicants, and applicants that were awarded benefits 
during the first stages of review (see text). Each panel reports results from a single regression estimated for applicants applying in the respective year-group. Variables included in the model were year-
dummies, a quartic in age at the baseline year, a quartic in average annual earnings in the four year prior to the baseline year, a dummy for whether the individual is non-white and classified as a high 
earner, and dummies for whether the 1-digit industry of the individual's main job prior to application. For applicants, we also include a dummy for high educated. For definitions of baseline, dip, drop, 
and recovery see equation (2) and (3) in the text.  Interactions of the baseline, dip, drop, and recovery variables with services are included in the model but not reported. Standard errors in parentheses 
































0.114 0.129 0.034 0.046 0.133 0.133 0.060 0.019 0.050 0.111 0.022 0.031
(0.043) (0.039) (0.042) (0.042) (0.032) (0.026) (0.028) (0.018) (0.030) (0.019) (0.027) (0.013)
0.005 0.054 -0.002 0.025 0.021 0.049 0.005 0.025 -0.005 0.031 0.006 0.021
(0.014) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
-0.242 -0.552 -0.164 -0.559 -0.208 -0.561 -0.177 -0.565 -0.190 -0.615 -0.109 -0.597
(0.054) (0.047) (0.038) (0.034) (0.045) (0.033) (0.032) (0.025) (0.035) (0.026) (0.027) (0.020)
-0.007 -0.008 -0.009 0.002 -0.003 -0.009 0.002 -0.003 0.001 -0.003 0.005 0.004
(0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
B. Annual Earnings ($1000)
-3.469 -2.747 0.242 -0.444 -4.265 -2.572 1.305 0.879 -9.116 -3.789 0.254 -0.393
(1.842) (1.661) (0.722) (0.616) (1.731) (1.613) (1.077) (0.598) (1.391) (1.381) (0.414) (0.299)
-1.109 -0.376 0.095 0.027 -1.882 -1.245 -0.630 -0.302 -3.585 -1.267 -0.242 0.134
(0.489) (0.495) (0.217) (0.176) (0.505) (0.461) (0.236) (0.170) (0.383) (0.417) (0.129) (0.127)
-9.286 -13.825 -6.087 -11.739 -12.989 -18.123 -10.215 -16.513 -14.871 -21.308 -8.491 -19.787
(1.486) (1.020) (0.880) (1.003) (1.354) (1.045) (0.973) (1.049) (1.131) (0.816) (0.848) (1.160)
0.203 -0.045 0.127 0.008 0.283 0.009 0.247 -0.120 0.328 0.116 0.000 -0.270
(0.171) (0.040) (0.168) (0.192) (0.133) (0.049) (0.240) (0.212) (0.146) (0.068) (0.194) (0.301)
Notes: Authors' calculations from 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text). The sample consists of non-applicants, finally rejected applicants, and applicants that were awarded benefits
during the first stages of review (see text). For definitions of baseline, dip, drop, and recovery see equation (2) in the text. The full model includes a quartic in age, and a quartic in average earnings in 
the four years prior to the base year; in addition, the model includes year effects interacted with ten dummies for earnings class prior to application and twelve industry dummies. Standard errors 
clustered at the year-earnings class-industry level are in parentheses. 
Appendix Table 1: Employment and Earnings Differences Before and After Application to SSDI Relative to Non-Applicants, Effects for Initially Allowed Beneficiaries and Rejected 
Applicants, Women Age 45-64
Full Model
Application During 1982-1987












































0.067 0.076 0.057 0.034 0.052 0.068 0.050 0.039 0.063 0.096 0.053 0.029
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004)
0.009 0.030 0.014 0.021 0.012 0.025 0.015 0.021 0.006 0.028 0.017 0.021
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
-0.182 -0.548 -0.149 -0.558 -0.192 -0.569 -0.146 -0.544 -0.172 -0.572 -0.118 -0.553
(0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009)
-0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.002 -0.003 0.000 -0.003 0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
B. Annual Earnings ($1000)
-7.022 -4.561 0.046 0.013 -8.761 -6.447 0.016 0.073 -9.789 -4.794 0.037 -0.014
(0.423) (0.496) (0.148) (0.165) (0.383) (0.410) (0.109) (0.119) (0.334) (0.411) (0.081) (0.101)
-2.226 -1.508 -0.189 -0.213 -2.666 -1.873 -0.382 -0.219 -3.407 -1.811 -0.225 -0.011
(0.123) (0.136) (0.062) (0.060) (0.117) (0.122) (0.050) (0.055) (0.098) (0.114) (0.039) (0.040)
-11.158 -15.754 -8.128 -15.202 -13.492 -18.844 -9.092 -16.262 -14.216 -19.383 -8.402 -16.759
(0.362) (0.308) (0.353) (0.602) (0.323) (0.232) (0.335) (0.679) (0.281) (0.244) (0.379) (0.762)
0.256 -0.012 -0.104 -0.307 0.469 0.053 -0.107 -0.450 0.464 0.099 -0.103 -0.378
(0.045) (0.035) (0.066) (0.107) (0.040) (0.024) (0.064) (0.127) (0.035) (0.025) (0.074) (0.157)
Notes: Authors' calculations from 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text). The sample consists of non-applicants, finally rejected applicants, 
and applicants that were awarded benefits during the first stages of review (see text). For definitions of baseline, dip, drop, and recovery see equation (2) in the 
text. The full model includes a quartic in age, and a quartic in average earnings in the four years prior to the base year; in addition, the model includes year 
effects interacted with ten dummies for earnings class prior to application and twelve industry dummies. Standard errors clustered at the year-earnings class-
industry level are in parentheses. 
Appendix Table 2: Employment and Earnings Differences Before and After Application to SSDI Relative to Non-Applicants, Effects for Initially 
Allowed Beneficiaries and Rejected Applicants, Women Age 30-44
Full Model
Application During 1982-1986
No Covariates Full Model
Drop at Application
Recovery After Application








Baseline Difference Relative 
to Non-Applicants
Baseline Difference Relative 
to Non-Applicants
Main Allowed 0.164 -0.006 -0.062 0.009 -4.953 -1.457 2.548 1.033
(0.076) (0.019) (0.070) (0.014) (2.001) (0.466) (1.698) (0.391)
High Earner Allowed -0.003 -0.014 -0.125 0.010 17.414 4.278 -16.108 0.104
(0.045) (0.011) (0.041) (0.006) (1.638) (0.447) (1.273) (0.116)
High Earner Rejected -0.051 0.019 0.005 0.008 16.693 3.953 -4.363 0.380
(0.049) (0.015) (0.071) (0.014) (1.948) (0.518) (2.185) (0.565)
High Education Allowed -0.077 -0.031 0.000 -0.014 0.460 0.888 -4.567 -0.347
(0.064) (0.014) (0.060) (0.009) (2.281) (0.748) (2.823) (0.245)
High Education Rejected -0.017 -0.006 0.158 -0.021 0.953 -0.504 -1.250 0.079
(0.061) (0.017) (0.075) (0.017) (2.523) (0.650) (2.477) (0.775)
Manufacturing Allowed -0.095 -0.030 -0.073 0.006 -4.343 -0.127 -1.829 -0.231
(0.046) (0.013) (0.049) (0.007) (1.887) (0.526) (1.297) (0.162)
Manufacturing Rejected -0.093 -0.007 -0.002 -0.003 2.389 0.640 0.355 -0.875
(0.055) (0.018) (0.076) (0.015) (2.215) (0.577) (2.505) (0.456)
Muscuskeletal Rejected -0.024 0.029 0.032 -0.005 3.660 1.627 -1.441 0.101
(0.098) (0.023) (0.097) (0.011) (3.870) (0.933) (2.173) (0.228)
Circulatory Allowed 0.073 0.042 0.014 0.001 3.450 1.539 1.012 -0.495
(0.078) (0.023) (0.081) (0.013) (1.871) (0.533) (2.149) (0.301)
Circulatory Rejected 0.052 0.007 -0.010 -0.002 1.139 -1.137 -1.062 -0.133
(0.068) (0.021) (0.072) (0.010) (2.995) (0.687) (1.764) (0.164)
Mental Health Allowed 0.095 0.039 0.017 0.012 -2.231 0.543 1.843 0.958
(0.074) (0.029) (0.096) (0.017) (3.484) (0.616) (2.808) (1.355)
Mental Health Rejected -0.021 -0.014 0.052 -0.005 3.005 -0.198 0.786 -0.015
(0.051) (0.015) (0.062) (0.009) (1.983) (0.557) (1.478) (0.167)
Injuries Allowed -0.047 0.008 -0.041 0.027 6.980 1.350 0.138 0.276
(0.080) (0.021) (0.085) (0.015) (2.526) (0.626) (2.378) (0.424)
Injuries Rejected -0.182 0.016 0.238 -0.016 3.361 1.983 1.837 -0.428
(0.144) (0.023) (0.166) (0.030) (3.062) (1.171) (2.308) (0.254)
Neoplasms Allowed 0.038 0.009 0.009 0.020 4.108 1.076 1.348 0.329
(0.081) (0.023) (0.093) (0.016) (2.544) (0.511) (2.194) (0.504)
Neoplasms Rejected -0.100 -0.007 -0.160 0.001 -0.230 0.484 -6.545 -0.042
(0.062) (0.015) (0.059) (0.007) (2.227) (0.669) (3.145) (0.198)
Notes: Authors' calculations from 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text). The sample consists of non-applicants, finally rejected applicants, and applicants that were awarded benefits 
during the first stages of review (see text). Each panel reports results from a single regression estimated for applicants applying in the respective year-group. Variables included in the model were year-
dummies, a quartic in age at the baseline year, a quartic in average annual earnings in the four year prior to the baseline year, a dummy for whether the individual is non-white and classified as a high 
earner, and dummies for whether the 1-digit industry of the individual's main job prior to application. For applicants, we also include a dummy for high educated and 16 dummies for major 
impairment code. For definitions of baseline, dip, drop, and recovery see equation (2) and (3) in the text.  Interactions of the baseline, dip, drop, and recovery variables with services are included in the 


















Main Allowed 0.129 0.084 -0.351 0.011 -4.518 -0.062 1.480 0.341
(0.055) (0.017) (0.054) (0.011) (1.959) (0.536) (1.754) (0.361)
Main Rejected 0.154 0.071 -0.096 0.001 -4.215 -0.774 4.023 0.098
(0.096) (0.025) (0.080) (0.017) (1.961) (0.525) (2.208) (0.437)
High Earner Allowed 0.013 -0.015 -0.147 -0.013 13.993 3.450 -15.752 -0.372
(0.052) (0.015) (0.059) (0.007) (2.208) (0.613) (1.992) (0.146)
High Earner Rejected -0.052 -0.025 -0.011 0.016 11.631 2.996 -4.887 0.276
(0.068) (0.019) (0.089) (0.014) (2.070) (0.696) (2.824) (0.316)
High Education Allowed -0.050 -0.021 0.033 0.009 3.019 1.195 -2.159 0.256
High Education Allowed 
(0.057) (0.017) (0.084) (0.010) (2.744) (0.960) (3.628) (0.216)
High Education Rejected -0.050 -0.028 0.147 -0.014 2.713 -0.756 -1.038 0.013
(0.065) (0.028) (0.100) (0.023) (2.159) (0.984) (4.054) (0.523)
Manufacturing Allowed -0.041 -0.005 -0.006 0.005 0.620 -0.677 0.226 0.265
(0.052) (0.014) (0.072) (0.008) (2.344) (0.721) (2.512) (0.151)
Manufacturing Rejected -0.017 -0.016 0.025 -0.007 3.355 -0.034 2.306 -0.722
(0.071) (0.020) (0.084) (0.015) (2.122) (0.670) (2.587) (0.325)
Musculoskeletal Allowed 0.017 -0.025 0.152 -0.004 4.665 0.683 0.919 0.087
(0.068) (0.031) (0.107) (0.017) (2.842) (1.036) (2.187) (0.291)
Musculoskeletal Rejected -0.020 -0.016 0.083 0.010 2.366 1.102 -0.775 0.631
(0.102) (0.026) (0.090) (0.016) (2.320) (0.690) (2.493) (0.287)
Circulatory Allowed -0.053 -0.020 0.024 -0.002 0.684 0.259 -0.282 -0.081
(0.069) (0.021) (0.080) (0.006) (1.984) (0.715) (2.169) (0.110)
Circulatory Rejected 0.035 -0.059 0.187 -0.020 -3.050 -0.714 1.551 0.200
(0.132) (0.047) (0.161) (0.023) (2.699) (0.990) (2.965) (0.475)
Mental Health Allowed -0.054 -0.023 0.126 -0.008 0.162 0.042 0.949 -0.141
(0.062) (0.019) (0.074) (0.008) (2.139) (0.675) (2.508) (0.157)
Mental Health Rejected -0.017 -0.027 -0.045 -0.002 -0.404 0.639 -2.207 -0.188
(0.100) (0.031) (0.118) (0.018) (2.520) (0.772) (3.365) (0.456)
Injuries Allowed 0.148 0.013 0.071 -0.001 1.336 0.375 2.556 0.038
(0.089) (0.025) (0.123) (0.012) (2.725) (0.897) (2.489) (0.179)
Injuries Rejected -0.048 0.002 0.215 -0.026 1.735 1.182 2.595 0.065
(0.123) (0.032) (0.112) (0.017) (2.416) (0.930) (2.750) (0.353)
Neoplasms Allowed -0.202 -0.047 -0.018 -0.013 -1.953 1.030 -4.925 -0.138
(0.065) (0.018) (0.066) (0.009) (3.517) (0.856) (3.085) (0.155)
Neoplasms Rejected -0.112 -0.039 0.478 -0.011 -4.697 -1.507 2.344 0.667
(0.163) (0.052) (0.229) (0.046) (3.317) (1.398) (3.911) (0.797)
Panel B: 1992-1997
Main Rejected 0.174 0.084 -0.271 0.004 -4.219 0.036 2.812 0.405
(0.053) (0.016) (0.058) (0.011) (1.727) (0.582) (2.147) (0.298)
Appendix Table 3: Differences Before and After Application to SSDI Relative to Non-Applicants, Difference for Alternative Groups of Allowed and Rejected Applicants Including 
Impairment Groups, Men Age 45-64 at Application within Five Years of Baseline, Interactions Included Jointly
Annual Earnings ($1000)Employment
Main Allowed 0.164 -0.006 -0.062 0.009 -4.953 -1.457 2.548 1.033
(0.076) (0.019) (0.070) (0.014) (2.001) (0.466) (1.698) (0.391)
High Earner Allowed -0.003 -0.014 -0.125 0.010 17.414 4.278 -16.108 0.104
(0.045) (0.011) (0.041) (0.006) (1.638) (0.447) (1.273) (0.116)
High Earner Rejected -0.051 0.019 0.005 0.008 16.693 3.953 -4.363 0.380
(0.049) (0.015) (0.071) (0.014) (1.948) (0.518) (2.185) (0.565)
High Education Allowed -0.077 -0.031 0.000 -0.014 0.460 0.888 -4.567 -0.347
(0.064) (0.014) (0.060) (0.009) (2.281) (0.748) (2.823) (0.245)
High Education Rejected -0.017 -0.006 0.158 -0.021 0.953 -0.504 -1.250 0.079
(0.061) (0.017) (0.075) (0.017) (2.523) (0.650) (2.477) (0.775)
Manufacturing Allowed -0.095 -0.030 -0.073 0.006 -4.343 -0.127 -1.829 -0.231
(0.046) (0.013) (0.049) (0.007) (1.887) (0.526) (1.297) (0.162)
Manufacturing Rejected -0.093 -0.007 -0.002 -0.003 2.389 0.640 0.355 -0.875
(0.055) (0.018) (0.076) (0.015) (2.215) (0.577) (2.505) (0.456)
Muscuskeletal Rejected -0.024 0.029 0.032 -0.005 3.660 1.627 -1.441 0.101
(0.098) (0.023) (0.097) (0.011) (3.870) (0.933) (2.173) (0.228)
Circulatory Allowed 0.073 0.042 0.014 0.001 3.450 1.539 1.012 -0.495
(0.078) (0.023) (0.081) (0.013) (1.871) (0.533) (2.149) (0.301)
Circulatory Rejected 0.052 0.007 -0.010 -0.002 1.139 -1.137 -1.062 -0.133
(0.068) (0.021) (0.072) (0.010) (2.995) (0.687) (1.764) (0.164)
Mental Health Allowed 0.095 0.039 0.017 0.012 -2.231 0.543 1.843 0.958
(0.074) (0.029) (0.096) (0.017) (3.484) (0.616) (2.808) (1.355)
Mental Health Rejected -0.021 -0.014 0.052 -0.005 3.005 -0.198 0.786 -0.015
(0.051) (0.015) (0.062) (0.009) (1.983) (0.557) (1.478) (0.167)
Injuries Allowed -0.047 0.008 -0.041 0.027 6.980 1.350 0.138 0.276
(0.080) (0.021) (0.085) (0.015) (2.526) (0.626) (2.378) (0.424)
Injuries Rejected -0.182 0.016 0.238 -0.016 3.361 1.983 1.837 -0.428
(0.144) (0.023) (0.166) (0.030) (3.062) (1.171) (2.308) (0.254)
Neoplasms Allowed 0.038 0.009 0.009 0.020 4.108 1.076 1.348 0.329
(0.081) (0.023) (0.093) (0.016) (2.544) (0.511) (2.194) (0.504)
Neoplasms Rejected -0.100 -0.007 -0.160 0.001 -0.230 0.484 -6.545 -0.042
(0.062) (0.015) (0.059) (0.007) (2.227) (0.669) (3.145) (0.198)
Notes: Authors' calculations from 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text). The sample consists of non-applicants, finally rejected applicants, and applicants that were awarded benefits 
during the first stages of review (see text). Each panel reports results from a single regression estimated for applicants applying in the respective year-group. Variables included in the model were year-
dummies, a quartic in age at the baseline year, a quartic in average annual earnings in the four year prior to the baseline year, a dummy for whether the individual is non-white and classified as a high 
earner, and dummies for whether the 1-digit industry of the individual's main job prior to application. For applicants, we also include a dummy for high educated and 16 dummies for major 
impairment code. For definitions of baseline, dip, drop, and recovery see equation (2) and (3) in the text.  Interactions of the baseline, dip, drop, and recovery variables with services are included in the 


















Main Allowed 0.124 0.060 -0.373 0.001 -1.093 0.636 -0.985 0.310
(0.016) (0.004) (0.016) (0.003) (0.530) (0.144) (0.481) (0.105)
Main Rejected 0.099 0.026 0.017 0.005 -1.961 -0.172 2.902 0.672
(0.019) (0.005) (0.022) (0.004) (0.483) (0.167) (0.516) (0.142)
High Earner Allowed -0.001 -0.008 -0.081 -0.004 14.152 3.533 -11.638 0.101
(0.012) (0.003) (0.014) (0.002) (0.534) (0.160) (0.468) (0.061)
High Earner Rejected -0.001 -0.001 -0.029 0.001 13.371 2.902 -3.949 0.274
(0.012) (0.004) (0.018) (0.003) (0.455) (0.179) (0.674) (0.158)
High Education Allowed -0.003 -0.012 0.048 -0.006 1.220 0.746 -0.920 0.016
High Education Allowed 
(0.014) (0.004) (0.018) (0.002) (0.716) (0.200) (0.728) (0.109)
High Education Rejected -0.021 -0.011 0.045 -0.002 0.318 -0.128 -0.174 0.433
(0.018) (0.005) (0.022) (0.004) (0.601) (0.201) (0.744) (0.216)
Manufacturing Allowed 0.008 -0.005 -0.012 0.001 -0.049 0.310 0.259 -0.079
(0.014) (0.004) (0.017) (0.002) (0.488) (0.167) (0.529) (0.071)
Manufacturing Rejected -0.025 -0.004 0.001 0.006 -0.235 0.131 0.126 -0.050
(0.015) (0.004) (0.018) (0.003) (0.430) (0.144) (0.544) (0.112)
Musculoskeletal Allowed -0.034 -0.012 0.109 0.003 0.787 0.468 1.497 0.078
(0.024) (0.007) (0.030) (0.004) (0.855) (0.393) (0.977) (0.117)
Musculoskeletal Rejected 0.032 0.020 0.088 0.008 1.687 0.797 2.047 0.218
(0.020) (0.006) (0.024) (0.004) (0.525) (0.181) (0.557) (0.103)
Circulatory Allowed -0.036 -0.010 0.028 0.002 -0.649 -0.285 0.218 0.139
(0.023) (0.006) (0.025) (0.003) (0.897) (0.234) (0.739) (0.069)
Circulatory Rejected -0.043 0.012 0.098 -0.017 0.227 0.477 1.953 -0.211
(0.033) (0.008) (0.037) (0.006) (0.839) (0.278) (1.051) (0.165)
Mental Health Allowed -0.010 -0.005 0.116 0.005 0.639 -0.255 1.390 0.166
(0.016) (0.004) (0.017) (0.002) (0.530) (0.152) (0.444) (0.069)
Mental Health Rejected -0.012 0.004 0.065 -0.010 1.267 0.120 1.676 -0.057
(0.022) (0.006) (0.026) (0.004) (0.525) (0.186) (0.596) (0.143)
Injuries Allowed -0.040 -0.012 0.080 0.008 0.128 -0.304 2.170 0.402
(0.025) (0.008) (0.033) (0.004) (0.946) (0.316) (0.870) (0.156)
Injuries Rejected 0.013 0.018 0.114 0.001 1.623 0.685 2.675 0.275
(0.023) (0.006) (0.026) (0.004) (0.591) (0.196) (0.658) (0.200)
Neoplasms Allowed -0.054 0.000 -0.054 0.005 -1.674 0.216 -3.403 0.117
(0.023) (0.006) (0.020) (0.002) (0.923) (0.253) (1.186) (0.089)
Neoplasms Rejected -0.063 0.018 0.092 -0.019 -0.756 -0.029 3.070 0.012
(0.082) (0.013) (0.090) (0.014) (1.905) (0.501) (3.290) (0.590)
Panel B: 1992-1997
Main Rejected 0.149 0.066 -0.391 0.007 -1.522 0.486 -1.442 0.213
(0.014) (0.004) (0.016) (0.003) (0.562) (0.141) (0.412) (0.090)
Appendix Table 4: Differences Before and After Application to SSDI Relative to Non-Applicants, Difference for Alternative Groups of Allowed and Rejected Applicants Including 
Impairment Groups, Men Age 45-64 at Application within Five Years of Baseline, Interactions Included Jointly
Annual Earnings ($1000)Employment
Main Allowed 0.111 0.031 0.039 0.008 -1.645 -0.031 2.694 0.693
(0.015) (0.004) (0.017) (0.004) (0.380) (0.109) (0.431) (0.141)
High Earner Allowed -0.049 -0.010 -0.080 -0.004 12.170 3.564 -11.269 -0.078
(0.011) (0.003) (0.015) (0.002) (0.461) (0.143) (0.459) (0.065)
High Earner Rejected -0.062 -0.008 -0.039 0.001 12.245 2.922 -3.683 0.090
(0.010) (0.003) (0.016) (0.003) (0.492) (0.148) (0.687) (0.130)
High Education Allowed -0.049 -0.014 0.055 -0.003 1.159 0.550 -1.735 -0.104
(0.013) (0.004) (0.019) (0.003) (0.768) (0.209) (0.643) (0.092)
High Education Rejected -0.017 0.001 0.019 0.002 0.386 0.189 -0.455 0.257
(0.014) (0.004) (0.019) (0.004) (0.689) (0.185) (0.744) (0.146)
Manufacturing Allowed -0.041 -0.004 0.009 -0.003 0.362 0.405 -0.363 -0.144
(0.013) (0.004) (0.018) (0.003) (0.557) (0.134) (0.497) (0.072)
Manufacturing Rejected -0.019 -0.005 0.006 -0.004 0.482 0.132 0.319 -0.196
(0.013) (0.004) (0.016) (0.003) (0.446) (0.108) (0.477) (0.097)
Muscuskeletal Rejected -0.008 -0.008 0.022 0.010 1.931 0.059 0.202 0.341
(0.020) (0.006) (0.030) (0.005) (0.716) (0.225) (0.774) (0.126)
Circulatory Allowed 0.023 0.013 0.034 0.010 1.225 0.499 2.054 0.299
(0.016) (0.004) (0.018) (0.003) (0.446) (0.125) (0.469) (0.105)
Circulatory Rejected -0.041 -0.008 0.009 -0.002 -0.619 -0.136 -1.849 0.132
(0.020) (0.006) (0.028) (0.004) (0.941) (0.228) (0.776) (0.111)
Mental Health Allowed -0.010 -0.009 -0.045 0.008 -1.100 -0.101 -0.758 0.251
(0.026) (0.007) (0.033) (0.006) (0.636) (0.226) (0.902) (0.180)
Mental Health Rejected -0.016 -0.017 0.084 0.008 1.417 -0.068 0.640 0.256
(0.013) (0.004) (0.017) (0.003) (0.508) (0.151) (0.450) (0.064)
Injuries Allowed 0.027 0.005 0.054 -0.001 1.379 0.132 1.583 -0.124
(0.016) (0.004) (0.019) (0.003) (0.488) (0.130) (0.564) (0.101)
Injuries Rejected -0.019 -0.020 0.047 0.012 0.200 -0.476 1.049 0.370
(0.020) (0.007) (0.035) (0.005) (0.690) (0.223) (0.945) (0.141)
Neoplasms Allowed 0.023 0.009 0.069 0.004 -0.189 0.358 2.694 0.182
(0.019) (0.005) (0.022) (0.004) (0.527) (0.144) (0.644) (0.229)
Neoplasms Rejected -0.047 -0.001 -0.103 0.008 -0.856 -0.083 -3.202 0.187
(0.020) (0.005) (0.020) (0.003) (0.833) (0.194) (0.736) (0.093)
Notes: Authors' calculations from 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text). The sample consists of non-applicants, finally rejected applicants, and applicants that were awarded benefits 
during the first stages of review (see text). Each panel reports results from a single regression estimated for applicants applying in the respective year-group. Variables included in the model were year-
dummies, a quartic in age at the baseline year, a quartic in average annual earnings in the four year prior to the baseline year, a dummy for whether the individual is non-white and classified as a high 
earner, and dummies for whether the 1-digit industry of the individual's main job prior to application. For applicants, we also include a dummy for high educated and 16 dummies for major 
impairment code. For definitions of baseline, dip, drop, and recovery see equation (2) and (3) in the text.  Interactions of the baseline, dip, drop, and recovery variables with services are included in the 
model but not reported. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level.
